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Preface 
  he food problem is to a large extent a local one. Accord- 
ingly, the starting point in the Food and Agriculture research 
of IIASA is the modeling of national food and agricultural 
systems. After having investigated local, national strategies 
directed towards specific goals (e.g. introducing new techno- 
logies, changing the agricultural structure, etc.) a generali- 
zation will be possible and conclusions can be drawn concerning 
the global outcomes of changing agricultural systems. Thus, 
the global investigation will be based on national models and 
their interactions. 
To reflect these interactions in a model, a aethodological 
research is required which is concerned with the linkage of 
national models for food and agriculture. This PiIemorandum is 
the second of a series on this topic. 
Previously on this topic: RM-77-2, Linking National Models 
of Food and Agriculture: An Introduction, January 1977. 

Summary 
T h i s  p a p e r  i s  t h e  second i n  t h e  series on t h e  l i n k a g e  o f  
n a t i o n a l  models  f o r  food  and a g r i c u l t u r e .  I t  d e v e l o p s  some o f  
t h e  i d e a s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t ,  i n t r o d u c t o r y  p a p e r  [ 1 4 ] .  
I n  S e c t i o n  1 ,  t h e  model w i t h  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  p o l i c y  and  
q u o t a ,  i s  r e h e a r s e d  and r e f o r m u l a t e d .  A proof  i s  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  e q u i i i b r i u m  a t  g i v e n  wor ld  marke t  
p r i c e s .  I t  i s  shown t h a t  when t h i s  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  un ique  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  e x c e s s  demand f u n c t i o n s  a r e  c o n t i n u o u s  i n  wor ld  marke t  
p r i c e s  and  s a t i s f y  W a l r a s '  Law s o  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  
l i n k i n g ,  p r e s e n t e d  i n  [ 1 4 ] ,  a r e  s a t i s f i e d .  The p roof  i s  a l s o  
v a l i d  f o r  a n  economy w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n .  
I n  S e c t i o n  2 ,  t h e  u n i q u e n e s s  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  e q u i l i b r i u m  
i s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  J a c o b i a n  m a t r i x .  
Al though t h i s  a n a l y s i s  d o e s  n o t  l e a d  t o  any u s e f u l  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  
p r e s e n t  model,  it g i v e s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  problems o n e  h a s  t o  
f a c e  a n d ,  moreover ,  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  J a c o b i a n s  i s  u s e f u l  f o r  
t h e  world. marke t  a l g o r i t h m ,  which w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  a  s e p a r a t e  
p a p e r .  
I n  S e c t i o n  3 ,  a t t e n t i o n  i s  c e n t e r e d  on t h e  a c t u a l  compu- 
t a t i d n  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  e q u i l i b r i u m .  The f i r s t  p a r a g r a p h  d e a l s  
w i t h  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  when t h e  
t r a d e d  q u a n t i t i e s  a r e  g i v e n .  Although t h e  c a s e  i s  n o t  v e r y  
r e l e v a n t  i n  i t s e l f ,  t h e  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  t h e  problem makes i t  use -  
f u l  a s  a  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t .  I n  t h e  second p a r a g r a p h ,  a  complementary 
p i v o t i n g  a l g o r i t h m  i s  deve loped  which c a n  s o l v e  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
e q u i l i b r i u m  problem i n  a  p u r e  exchange economy w i t h  Cobb 
Douglas  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  t h i r d  p a r a g r a p h ,  s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  c a s e s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  which a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  s o l v e .  
S t o c k  p o l i c y  i s  i n t r o d u c e d  and a  model w i t h  l agged  p r o d u c t i o n  
i s  d i s c u s s e d .  
The a u t h o r  i s  g r a t e f u l  t o  C. ~ e m a r g c h a l ,  R .  M i f f l i n  and 
K.S. P a r i k h  f o r  h e l p f u l  comments. 
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SECTION 1: A NATIONAL MODEL WITH DOMESTIC PRICE POLICIES 
AND QUOTA ON INTERNATlONAL TRADE 
1.1 Introduction: the main features of the model 
a We discuss the pure exchange version of the model, 
which means that we take supply as given and concen- 
trate on demand by the consumer, at given endowments. 
e The consumer is taxed by a government which has to 
pay subsidies on international trade, or the con- 
sumer receives income transfers from tariff receipts. 
These receipts may also be used in other ways; this 
will be discussed in 1.3. 
a Price differences between world market and domestic 
market are caused, either by a domestic price policy, 
or by quota on international trade. 
a The government must tax the consumers in such a way 
that both its budget and the balance of trade are in 
equilibrium. 
The model presented in [ 1 4 ]  is now repeated and then 
reformulated. In 1.4 an existence proof for the 
domestic equilibrium is presented. 
1.2 The model 
1) Consumer 
j max u (XI) 
2) Government 
3) Domestic market equilibrium 
* 4) Equilibrium on the balance of trade 
The model has been discussed in ([14], 5 4.3) 
existence of a domestic price equilibrium will now be 
proved after some reformulations. 
Symbols 
u j utility of the j th income class (j=1 . . ,m) 
X -j (vector of) demand of the j th income class 
Y I net endowments of the jth income class 
tr total tariff receipts by the government 
share of jth income class in tr 
1 ,r minimum resp. maximum export of the i th 
commodity (i = l,..,n) 
- 
Pi price target for the ith commodity 
p; world market price 
Pi domestic price 
b i t  v price differential as defined under 3) i 
1.3 Reformulation of the model 
1.3.1 The export constraint 
The export constraint may lead to an inconsistency as it 
implies x 2 - y - r . This may be incompatible with nonnegative 
domestic prices. To solve this problem an extra slack vector s 
must be introduced. 
Define 
The quota constraint becomes: 
The complementarity (market equilibrium) conditions are then: 
The tariff receipts are 
Balance of trade equilibrium implies 
When solving the model we first compute consumer demand, when 
pi = 0 we compute si = max (0, yi - r - xi). i 
1.3.2 Taxation and distribution of tariff receipts 
Up to this point the budget equation of the consumer has 
merely been specified as: 
j pxj = a. tr + py . 
3 
It was not said whether a was a variable or a parameter. j 
If we would consider it as a parameter we have the following 
problem: Under balance of trade equilibrium the budget equation 
is: 
It can be seen from this equation that for any given vector 
a such that Eaj = 1,O < a. < 1 and given (x - y) 0 there 3 - 
exists a nonnegative price vector p such that p xJ - < 0 .  his 
is not acceptable. The vector a must therefore be considered as 
a variable. It reflects the tax system in the country. This 
system may discriminate among production sectors and income classes. 
A more general formulation would be 
taxes government expenditures tariff receipts 
j Bi = f(py,p) (function to determine taxation rate) 
We assume that the government expenditures are totally in- 
elastic, and that the tax share 8, is homogeneous of degree 
J 
zero in domestic prices 
- - 
tg = p g g is given. 
1.3.3 The balance of trade 
We replace 
W W p (y - x) = 0 by: p ( Y -  ( x +  s)) L O  - . 
Where s is defined as above. 
The inequality is only a slight relaxation because we shall find 
that in world market equilibrium it becomes again an equality. 
1.3.4 The national model reformulated 
1) Consumer 
j j max u ( x )  
= p y ~  - a ta . [ B ~ :  income class specific j taxation rate 
6 gift in kind (see below)] j ' 
2 )  Government 
a) l z y - d < r  - quota constraints 
- 1) b) P = P* domestic price policy 
C) tr = (pW - p) (y - d) net tariff receipts 
- - 
d) g =16'+go ; tq = pg ; government expenditures 
e) ta = tg - tr taxes 
3) Domestic market: definitions 
4) Domestic market equilibrium 
a) l-Ii (yi - di - 1.) = 0 
1 
b) v (yi - di - ri) = 0 i 
"1 pis= = 0 
d) p, 1-1, v L - 0 
e) s, x z O  - . 
5) Balance of trade equilibrium 
pW (d - y) 2 0 . 
taxation rates 
aggregate demand 
W 1) More precisely p = kp*, Zpi = k , k = 1 . 
6) Assumptions on the policy variables 
a) pW1(O - Quota compatible with balance 
b) p W r > ~  - . of trade equilibrium. 
c) 1 5  - r by definition. 
d) r < y .  less exports than domestic availability 
-* 
e) p > O  desired domestic price is positive 
7) Assumptions on endowments 
For each j , 3i such that 
yJ > 0 for some i . i 
1.3.4 The solution of the national model 
The national model is a set of equations which is 
simultaneous on three levels: 
1) A utility maximization problem in principle involves 
the solution of a (simultaneous) set of first order 
conditions. The simultaneity may be avoided however 
by making use of duality theory. 
2) The utility maximization problems are interdependent 
through the taxation policy because tariff receipts 
are influenced by aggregate demand (eq. 2), c). 
3) The domestic equilibrium prices are not given but are 
determined simultaneously with demand. 
ad 1) We know from elementary demand theory that problem 1) 
will have a unique solution, xj for any positive in- 
cone and nonnegative prices p, under the appropriate nonsaturation 
j assumptions for the utility function, u . We also know that at 
given B the demand will be homogeneous to the degree zero in j 
domestic prices. Let Sn be the set of nonnegative domestic 
prices. We assume that the utility functions are strictly 
quasi-concave. First set 6' = 0, then the demand function 
xJ = xj (p) can be shown to be continuous for all p such that 
p > 0, pc Sn and pyj > 0. Some problems of discontinuity 
however arise when some prices tend to zero, first because the 
income of certain income groups might be zero, second because 
the demand for a commodity might be infinite. In order to 
avoid the first complication we assume that the government 
offers an infinitely small amount of all commodity endowments 
to all income classes (61) so that all incomes are positive 
at all prices in sn . We know that in this case the demand 
j functions will be upper semicontinuous and jx.1 x! = xj (p)\ 
1 1  i 
is a closed bounded convex set (cf. Lancaster 191 or Arrow and 
Hahn [ 1 1  ) . 
The assignment of a positive 6' may seem restrictive from 
a theoretical point of view and in fact less restrictive solutions 
are available (cf. Arrow and Hahn [I]), but one can hardly imagine 
that the error introduced could be of any importance. As 
mentioned before we nay compute the slack variable si as follows: 
s = O  if Pi > 0 and s = max (0, yi - r - x.) otherwise. i i i 1 
ad 2) Simultaneous solution of the utility maximization 
problems ; 
* Assume that 4 c holds everywhere, also out of market 
equilibrium. 
tr = (pW-p)(y -(x + g +  s)) 
This equation is the equilibrium condition for the 
simultaneous solution of the utility maximization problems. 
In general the utility maximization problems have to be solved 
independently given domestic prices and a share a 
j of a 
given total amount of taxes ta = -t: 
max j j u (X ) 
d(a .t) 
* a is assumed to satisfy I j dt > 0 and Ca = 1  . - j 
Moreover a is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in j 
domestic prices. Summation of budget equations yields: 
so that the budget equilibrium coincides with equilibrium of 
the balance of trade. 
The equation 
will have a unique solution if 
pwd(t) is a monotonously increasing function of t, 
such that lim pwd(t) = + m . 
t++ 
We know that by Walras' Law (nonsaturation) 
d(pd(t)) = limpd(t)= and dt 
t++ 
inferior goods) 
then we know that the condition is satisfied. 
We assume that this condition holds. Again it is clear 
that theoretically speaking the balance of trade equilibrium 
condition is unnecessarily restrictive for the existence of 
market equilibrium. We shall now relax this condition and 
discuss domestic equilibrium under quota and domestic price 
policy. 
1 . 4  Domestic price equilibrium 
The existence proof for a domestic price equilibrium is 
not a trivial one. We shall proceed in three stages: 
1 )  First we shall literally reproduce the proof of the excess 
demand theorem by Debreu [ 4 ] .  This proof would apply to 
the national model if 1 = r = 0 . 
2) Then we shall open up the economy and formulate an 
appropriate maximization problem. 
The c r u x  o f  t h e  p roo f  i s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  l i n e a r  
programming problem o c c u r r i n g  i n  t h e  p r o o f  by  Debreu.  
S e v e r a l  l i n e a r  p r o g r a m ~ i n g  problems are f o r m u l a t e d ,  
f i r s t  f o r  t h e  case o f  a n  impor t  q u o t a  o n l y ,  t h e n  f o r  
e x p o r t  q u o t a ,  t h e n  f o r  b o t h  and  f i n a l l y  f o r  a c o m b i n a t i o n  
o f  i m p o r t  q u o t a ,  e x p o r t  q u o t a ,  and  a d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  p o l i c y .  
1 . 4 . 1  D e b r e u ' s  e x c e s s  demand theo rem 
C o n s i d e r  t h e  s e t  o f  e x c e s s  demand f u n c t i o n  z  = z ( p ) ,  
which s a t i s f i e s  p  z  (p.) 5 0 . Does t h i s  p roblem have  a 
s o l u t i o n  z  - < 0 ? L e t  p  b e  t h e  s e t  o f  n o r m a l i z e d  p r i c e s .  
T h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  a  compact convex se t .  Denote  by  Z t h e  s e t  
o f  a l l  z ( p )  f o r  p  E P [ Z  i s  t h e  un ion  o f  t h e  sets Z ( p )  1 .  I f  
Z i s  n o t  t h e  convex ,  w e  r e p l a c e  it by any  compact convex s e t  
c o n t a i n i n g  8 ,  which  w e  d e n o t e  by Z ' .  
Now d e f i n e  t h e  s e t  S ( z )  as f o l l o w s :  
S ( z )  = [ p l p z  i s  a maximum f o r  z  E Z ' ,  p  E PI . 
T h a t  i s ,  w e  choose  a n  a r b i t r a r y  e x c e s s  demand v e c t o r  f rom t h e  
s e t  o f  a l l  e x c e s s  demand v e c t o r s  which a r e  a t t a i n a b l e  a t  some 
p r i c e s ,  t h e n  f i n d  t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  f o r  which  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
t h i s  e x c e s s  demand i s  maximized. I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  
t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  i s  any  p r i c e  v e c t o r ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p  which i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  z  t h r o u g h  t h e  
mapping p  + Z ( p )  . 
C l e a r l y  z  - - + S ( z )  i s  a  mapping f rom Z '  i n t o  a  s u b s e t  o f  P .  
S i n c e  Z i s  convex  w e  know t h i s  mapping t o  b e  u p p e r  s e m i -  
c o n t i n u o u s .  S ( z )  i s  a  convex se t  s i n c e  it i s  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  h y p e r p l a n e  [ y l y z  = max p z ]  w i t h  P .  
C o n s i d e r  t h e  s e t  P x  Z ' ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  s e t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
n o r m a l i z e d  p r i c e  v e c t o r s  p a i r e d  w i t h  e x c e s s  demand v e c t o r s .  
I f  w e  t a k e  some p o i n t  p ,  z  i n  p  x  Z ' ,  t h e n  Z ( p )  a s s o c i a t e s  a 
s e t  o f  e x c e s s  demand v e c t o r s  w i t h  p ,  and  S ( z )  a s s o c i a t e s  a  
s e t  o f  p r i c e  v e c t o r s  w i t h  z .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  t h e  mapping 
p ,  z  -+ Z ( p ) ,  S ( z )  maps a p o i n t  i n  P x  Z '  i n t o  a  s u b s e t  o f  
P x  Z ' .  
W e  have  shown t h e  mapping z  4 S ( z )  t o  b e . u p p e r  s e m i -  
c o n t i n u o u s ,  and  p  + Z ( p )  h a s  been  assumed t o  have  t h e  same 
property, so that the combined mapping is upper semocontinuous 
also. We have shown that S(z) is convex and Z(p) has been 
assumed convex, so that S (z) x Z (p) is convex. 
Thus we have an upper semicontinuous mapping p, z + S(z) 
from the set P x Z' into a convex subset of itself. These are 
the conditions for invoking the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem. 
The theorem states that there exists some p * ~  P, z* E Z' which 
is a fixed point, that is, for which p* E S(z*) and z* E Z(p*). 
From the construction of S (z) , p* E S (z*) implies that, 
for all p E P I  
Using the weak budget condition it follows that, since 
z* E: Z(p*) 1 
* * < o  . P Z  = 
Thus 
pz* 5 - 0, for all P E P  . 
2) Clearly the last inequality is satisfied for all p E P 
only if 
thus proving the theorem?) One important feature of this proof 
is that it does not require p and z to have the same dimension. 
The other important feature of this proof for our purpose 
is that S(z) = [plmax pz for z E Z' , p E P'] represents the 
solution of a linear programme. 
max p z 
S.T. Cpi = 1 
) Scarf [13] p. 1 1  9-1 29, has derived an algorithm for computing 
this equilibrium solution. 
This programme can be extended without changing the essence 
of the proof. The budget equations yield Walras' Law for the 
present case (t = - taxes) . 
From this we can derive the simplex for the present case: 
z is homogeneous of degree zero in (p,t). If (p,t) is a linear 
function of another vector, say w, w 2 - 0, then z is homogeneous 
of degree zero in this vector. 
We may therefore set the sum of these nonneqative variables 
to eaual 1, and thus constrain them to the simplex. 
1.4.2 Existence proof for domestic equilibrium 
1.4.2.1 Import quota only: 
The essential part of the proof is that we substitute 
out the variable t from Walras' Law. We set t = - y 1 so that 
p z + v  1 = 0  . 
Define 
q = z + l  
P = y + @pW 
where 
pit @ ) 0 
@ + Lyi = 1 (y , @ on the simplex) . 
We may restrict ( @ ,  LI) to the simplex because x p Y  = 1 and 
because of the substitution t = - y 1 . 
We can rewrite Walras' Law as 
We now set up a linear programme analogous to the one in 
Debreu's proof 
max ll@pwz + ~1 4 
Analogously to the previous case we find that the goal function 
has zero value in the fixed point (the mapping can be considered 
just as before to be an upper semi continuous mapping of a 
compact convex set into itself) . 
So t h a t  w e  f i n d  
PWz* 5 0  W ( i f  $ *  > 0  t h e n  p  z* = 0;  i f  pW1 > 0  t h e n  $ *  = 0 )  
q* - < 0  
- 
,*q* = 0  
Note t h a t  t 2 - - p 1 i m p l i e s  t > -py because  
1 . 4 . 2 . 2  E x p o r t s  q u o t a  o n l y  
A s  mentioned e a r l i e r  e x p o r t  q u o t a  p r e s e n t  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  i f  t h e y  a r e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  e x c e s s  demand i f s e l f  
i n f e a s i b i l i t y  might  a r i s e  w i t h  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  n o n n e g a t i v i t y  
of  p r i c e s .  
We t h e r e f o r e  d e f i n e  
We r e s t r i c t  t h e  t a x a t i o n  t o :  
W Walras '  Law i s  t h e n :  0  = p  ( d  - y )  + v q  
c o n s i d e r  now t h e  L.  P.  : 
max I rnpw(d - y )  + v q  
a s  b e f o r e  we s e t  s = 0  i f  pi > 0  and si = max (0 .  yi-ri-xi) i 
o t h e r w i s e .  
I n  t h e  f i x e d  p o i n t  we f i n d :  
0  = $* pW(d*-y)  + v* q* 
W 
s e t t i n g  $ = 1 we g e t  p  (d*-y) - 0  . 
We c a n  however n o t  se t  $ = 0  w i t h o u t  l e a v i n g  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  s e t .  
W However, because we have assumed p r 2 - 0 we may write 
0 2 p* q* - > p q* all p on simplex 
so that p* $ 0 
and p* q* = 0 
and W p (d*-y) 5 - 0 (if @ *  > 0 then pw(d*-y) = 0) . 
As before the condition y > r, guarantees a positive income. 
1.4.2.3 Import and export quota 
Combining both previous problems we procees as 
follows: Define: 
We set 
t = -  11 1 + vr 
so that Walras' Law is 
We can prove by combination of both previous problems ( 4 ,  P, 
on simplex) that 
* (if @* > 0 then pW(d -y) = 0) 
1.4.2.4 Import, export quota and domestic price 
policy 
In this case we set: 
t = -  u l + v r + @ h  
This yields the complication that the demand functions have to 
be solved simultaneously: 
At given 4 ,  p, v we must iterate over h in order to 
W 
realize h = (p - p )z. We have however shown before (ad 2) 
that this problem has a unique solution. 
Otherwise the case is identical to the case without 
domestic price policy. 
This completes the existence proof. 
We have only assumed on production that y > r > 1 and that 
W p r 2 0 . In an economy with production 1, r can by assumption 
be set at this level. We then first solve a profit maximization 
problem at given prices and when output has been determined 
adjust (r, 1) . 
Computation of dpmestic equilibrium: 
As mentioned before Scarf ([13], p. 119-129) has presented an 
algorithm to compute a fixed point of the mapping in Debreu's proof. 
The same algorithm would apply for the computation of domestic 
equilibrium in our model. We are however, mainly interested 
in unique domestic equilibria as will be explained below. This 
paper will therefore be oriented towards the development of 
alternative algorithms which specifically apply to unique 
equilibria. We return to this matter in section 3. 
1.5 World market equilibrium under pure exchange 
The existence of world market equilibrium can be shown 
in several ways. 
The most direct approach would be to consider all domestic 
markets simultaneously with the world market and to formulate 
a linear programme accordingly. The proof would be straightfor- 
ward but hardly instructive for the linking problem. It is 
computationally a very hard task to solve all prices for all 
countries simultaneously, when there are quota. Moreover the 
interpretation of the model is very difficult when everything 
is computed in one algorithm. We therefore want to decompose 
the equilibrium problem into two components. 
1) Compute a domestic equilibrium price and excess demand 
W given a world market price: p + zc , z = d 
C C - Yc 
2) Compute a world market equilibrium price. 
We have seen that in every country for every world market 
price the domestic equilibrium excess demand zc, exists, and 
W 
satisfies balance of trade constraint p zc 2 0 . 
The only further prerequisite for decomposition is that 
zc (pW) is sufficiently continuous. We therefore prove two 
lemma's on continuity. CJe need for this the following lemma 
by Arrow & Hahn [l (p. 102)]: 
t If the utility function U(x) is strictly quasi concave, 
if the income is positive for all p then x(p) is continuous 
in its domain of definition which includes all p > 0 and 
F xi(p) is continuous everywhere on the unit simplex, where 
C xi(p) = a if xi(p) is not defined. 
The formulation of the theorem is more complex than might 
appear at first sight. 
1. It is not stated that whenever pi = 0 for some i , 
x (p) is not defined. This would imply that in equilibrium i 
all prices must be positive. A commodity,for which this how- 
ever happens to be the case,is called numeraire. 
2. We know that the mapping p -+ x is uppersemicontinuous 
on the unit simplex and have used this in the proof of the 
existence of domestic equilibrium. The theorem is in accordance 
with this but provides more inforr.ation. 
We now state our lemma's 
Lema(1)- If the domestic market has a unique equilibrium and 
if there are finite import quota on all commodities then the 
W 
mapping p z is a continuous point to point mapping. 
Proof : 
As there are import quota on all commodities 
2. < ki 
1 = 
so that Cz. < Cki in equilibriun. 
1 = 
Thus z. (p) must be defined (uniquely) in equilibrium so that 
1 
zi(p) is continuous for all p in equilibrium. 
w r Consider a sequence pr --t p: . Since p is unique the 
w r 
univalued function pr = p(pr) is defined. Since p is bounded 
there exists a convergent subsequence. 
r Since z(p ) is a vector of continuous functions 
But by construction z (pr) < k v r  so that 
- 
W Then by the uniqueness hypothesis = po q.e.d. 
Lemma(2): If the domestic market has a unique equilibrium 
and if the domestic price for the commodities 
W is positive then the mapping p -+ z is a continuous point to 
point napping. 
Proof: 
If the domestic prices p are positive then zi(p) is continuous 
in p so that the proof in (1) holds. 
It would be possible to generalize the proposition but this 
may be superfluous for our present purposes: in our agri- 
cultural model no government will ever let the domestic price 
* 
of any commodity be zero. The world market equilibrium price 
might well be zero. 
We may thus list the theorem. 
Theorem 
Under either the assumptions of (1) or (2) the national 
excess demand mappings are continuous functions which satisfy 
-x p z 5 - 0 so that a world market equilibrium exists. The excess 
demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in world market 
prices. 
The previous theorem has assumed uniqueness of domestic 
price equilibrium. The second section of this paper will be 
centered around this issue. 
This however needs some preliminary work such as the 
derivation of Jacobians. The Jacobians will not be very help- 
ful for our problem but we have to see why. Moreover, the 
Jacobians will show to be helpful for the computation of the 
equilibrium solution on the world market, this will be dis- 
cussed in a separate paper. 
* A stock policy to maintain a positive floor price for a 
domestically produced commodity would be relevant (see also 
section 3.3). Therefore in most practical cases the domestic 
price will be positive and the domestic excess supply zero. 
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SECTION 2: THE UNIQUENESS OF DOMESTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
2.1 The S l u t s k y  e q u a t i o n s  and t h e  J a c o b i a n  
B e f o r e  w e  i n v e s t i g a t e  u n i q u e n e s s ,  t h e  demand r e s p o n s e s  
o f  t h e  model as e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  w e l l  known S l u t s k y  e q u a t i o n  
w i l l  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  J a c o b i a n  p l a y s  
a  c r u c i a l  r o l e  b o t h  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  u n i q u e n e s s ,  and t h e  
c o m p u t a t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
2 . 1 . 1  Given income and  g i v e n  p r i c e s  
T h i s  is  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  c a s e .  The d e r i v a t i o n  c a n  b e  found  
i n  L a n c a s t e r  [ 9 ]  
max u ( X I  
S.T. px = m 
t h e  F.O.C. a r e  u  = Api i 
px = m 
a )  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  F.O.C. t o  t h e  nth p r i c e  y i e l d s :  
( b u d g e t  e q u a t i o n )  
a x .  A i f  i = n  
- 
P i  0 else 
b )  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  t o  m y i e l d s :  
A f t e r  s u b s t i t u t i o n  ui = Api , t h e  e q u a t i o n s  sub  a )  c a n  b e  
r e w r i t t e n  i n  m a t r i x - v e c t o r  £ o m .  
The matrix of this equation system is the bordered Hessian 
o f u :  6 .  
X a by Cramer's rule one gets Solving for - 
aph 
where U is the cofactor of u in det 9 
r r 
'rh is the cofactor of u in det U rn 
Analogously one can obtain from the set of equations sub b) 
X 
a r -  
- -  
X Ur, 
am det u 
A A 
Writing Krn = A Urn/det U and substituting in the previous 
equation one gets the well known Slutsky equation. 
K is symmetric. 
rn 
* 
'n 
< 0 
* and the matrix [-a,] has positive principal minors 
* both PK = 0 and Kp = 0 
* the sign of Krn can be positive or negative 
axr - b u t  t h e  own p r i c e  e f f e c t ,  - - - a xr xr + K r r ,  i s  n e g a t i v e  
ap, L 
axr  > 0 o r  n o t  i f  t h e  commodity r i s  n o t  i n f e r i o r  t h a t  i s  i f  = 
n e g a t i v e  enough.  
2 . 1 . 2  The p u r e  exchange economy 
W e  now c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s e  where m - py and  y  i s  
g i v e n .  The o n l y  change  which t h e n  o c c u r s  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  
S l u t s k y ' s  e q u a t i o n  i s  i n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  b u d g e t  
e q u a t i o n  t o  p r i c e s ;  h e r e  one  g e t s :  
Thus S l u t s k y ' s  e q u a t i o n  becomes: 
The own p r i c e  e f f e c t  is :  
axr 
even  i f  t h e n  t h e r e  are no i n f e r i o r  goods - may be  p o s i t i v e  
f o r  a  n e t  p r o d u c e r  o f  commodity r a P r  
( w e a l t h  e f f e c t )  . 
2 . 1 . 3  P u r e  exchange economy w i t h  t a r i f f s  and unequa l  
income d i s t r i b u t i o n  ( c f .  11, 5 4 i n  [ 1 4  1 ) . 
2 . 1 . 3 . 1  The consumer ' s  model is  ( a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
t h e  income class)  : 
max j  j  u  ( x  
7 
S.T. 
and  m = p x j  j 
Now one  c a n  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t o  d o m e s t i c  and  t o  wor ld  marke t  
p r i c e s ,  w e  t h u s  assume a d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  p o l i c y  o n  a l l  commodi t ies .  
Domestic ~rices 
Again only the differentiation of the budget equation to prices 
yields a change, so that Slutsky's equation now becomes: 
The income effect may dominate the substitution effect so that 
the own price effect may be positive. 
World market ~rices 
World market prices only affect in a direct way the tariffs 
receipts so that differentiation to prices yields 
The change in the second equation is important as it implies 
that there is nc substitution effect anymore. The Slutsky 
equation is (the own price effect can be of any sign): 
2 .1 .3 .2  The Slutskv eauations at the national 
level follow from summation over income classes 
Define j 
ax- 
then: 
and 
We shall now consider the Jacobians when balance of trade 
equilibrium is satisfied. These are the relevant ones for 
the external behaviour of the country. 
W tr = (p-pW) z ; p z = 0 in equilibrium ; 
thus 
and 
atr - 
- -  
axi 
!Pi% + Zh 
aph 1 
Now define 1) 
for i,h = l..n , 
1) 
[aik] indicates a matrix with elements a ik - 
Then previous results may be written as: 
- 
The matrix V is however singular: we know that 
by the definition of li , 
thus 
p (I - [liph]) = 0 for all p, so that 
- - 
is singular and no explicit formulation for FfQ is available 
* Note however that 
n- 1 
C piliph' < ph SO that 
i=l 
any principal minor of V has diagonal dominance and is non- 
singular (if there are no inferior goods) . 
* Note also that if all income classes have the same marginal 
propensities to consume, 
j axi h axi 
- 
-  - then Wih + l i z h = O  . 
a j a h  
We now shall reformulate the equations in order to get an 
explicit Slutsky equation. (We shall time and again find that 
the difference between marginal propensities to consume com- 
plicates matters). 
From balance of trade equilibrium follows 
and 
Thus 
n- 1  P n a x i  'n 
= 1 
w h '  h=l  , . . , n  i= 1 Pn Ph Ph 
and 
Lemma 
Def ine  V = I - 
V h a s  d i a g o n a l  dominance f o r  t h e  p r i c e s  p  i f  t h e r e  a r e  no i n f e r i o r  goods.  
Proof  
From t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  li f o l l o w s :  
t h u s  
t h e n  we prove  t h a t  
t h i s  can  be  seen  a s  f o l l o w s :  
c a s e  1 : assume 
t h e n  w e  have t o  prove  
W (pi-pnpi) ( Pi 
t h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  c a s e  
W 
c a s e  2 :  pi - PnPi < 0 
t h e n  w e  must prove  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a p a r a b o l a .  
Clearly 
so that only one posi-tive root exists. 
W This root is however larger than p.p if: 
I n 
that is if 
which is clearly the case. 
So the matrix V has diagonal dominance and thus is non- 
singular. (end of proof. ) 
for k,h = l,..n . 
consider the reduced system of n-1 commodities 
Defining 
\fe may write 
- 2 6  - 
thus we get an explicit formulation for the Jacobian: 
axn ax k axn From this the elements - - and - can easily be derived. 
a P; 
In a similar way one gets an explicit formulation for domestic 
prices. 
G = 1 Kih + W + lizh I as before ih 
then 
Again the nth row and column may be derived from this. 
Induced changes in domestic prices: 
Changes in world market prices may induce changes in domestic 
prices. The total effect of a mutation in world market prices 
then becomes for the first n-1 commodities: 
where 
. = [a] 
and 
and H and V a r e  d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e .  
The d i r e c t  p r i c e  e f f e c t  o f  wor ld  market  p r i c e s  a t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  (and a t  wor ld  l e v e l )  can  b e  though t  o f  e x i s t i n g  
,r - 
of  
a )  a n  income e f f e c t  due t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
1 )  marg ina l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  t o  consume 
2 )  r e s o u r c e  ownership y 
3 )  s h a r e s  i n  t a r i f f  r e c e i p t s  a 
5 )  a s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  due t o  d i f f e r e n t  S l u t s k y  
j m a t r i c e s  K . The p r i c e  e f f e c t s  a r e  t h u s  a g g r e g a t e  
e f f e c t s  and can  b e  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e  i f  o n l y  because  
t h e  income e f f e c t  w i l l  be p o s i t i v e  f o r  n e t  p r o d u c e r s  
and n e g a t i v e  f o r  n e t  consumers.  
2 .1.4 The J a c o b i a n  m a t r i x  under  ( t a r i f f s  and)  q u o t a  
The domes t i c  market  e q u i l i b r i u m  can a t  g iven  d e s i r e d  
W domes t i c  p r i c e s  p and p be  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
Where 
and 
Domestic equilibrium has been shown to exist at any world market 
price. 
The Jacobian can be set up in two ways 
1) Jacobian of the domestic market at given 
world market prices; 
2) the Jacobian of the total system (domestic and 
world market equilibrium considered simultaneously). 
2.1.4.1 The Jacobian for domestic equilibrium 
As the problem has been formulated in "standard" 
format we may proceed by writing down the matrix 
acli 
J = -  
apj 
and investigate its properties. 
From the definition of q follows that: 
* The reaction of the domestic market to mutations 
in world market prices. 
When we studied the effects of mutations in worlc! market 
prices on an economy with tariffs without quota restrictions we 
allowed for possible "induced" mutations in do~.estic prices. 
The Jacobian matrix was then 
- 1 E = V  (H + G P )  
If we now disregard all induced mutations in domestic 
prices having other causes than quota restrictions and if we 
only consider the national excess demand function where it 
is differentiable to world market prices (i.e. where a marginal 
change does not change the list of effective quota) and if we 
assume domestic price equilibrium, then we know that 
dzi 
- -  
dpi 
either - 0  or - -  - 0 (other world market prices 
dp; dp; remaining constant) 
We may now decompose the equation for the Jacobi.an'rnatrix 
- 1 define U = v 
f:: ::.I 
We may set El, a matrix with dimensions r x n, equal to zero, 
indicating that the first r commodities have (and keep!) 
effective quota constraints. 
Complernentarily the matrix p with dimensions (n - r), n 2 
can be set equal to zero. 
One thus gets: 
Solving the first set of equations for P1 and substituting in 
the second one gets: 
and 
(Note that (I - G1 (U1 G1)-'ul) is indempotent.) 
We still have not proved that UIGl is nonsingular. As U is 
nonsingular U1 has rank r: now if G1 also has rank r, then 
U1 G1 has rank r and is nonsingular. 
We assume here that G has rank n-1. This assumption will be 
discussed in more detail below, in a note: it illustrates some 
problems of aggregation of Jacobians. 
Under this assumption we nay however conclude that U1 G1 will 
be nonsingular if r 5 - n-1. 
2.1.4.2 The Jacobian matrix of the total system 
The Jacobian matrix derived in the previous pages 
is not very general because of the differentiability requirement. 
In domestic equilibrium national excess demand functions are 
not differentiable for all world market prices. In order to 
restore differentiability one must simultaneously consider 
the equilibrium conditions for all markets. In order to do 
this the restriction q > 0 of the domestic market must be 
- 
relaxed and the total Jacobian matrix must be investigated. 
So the total matrix can be written out as: 
where m indicates the number of countries and i is the country 
index : 
-azh  m 
- 
- 1 
and S = -- - - 1 (Vi  H i )  
~ P Z  i= 1
T h i s  s y s t e m  i s  however v e r y  l a r g e  a s  soon  a s  many c o u n t r i e s  are 
c o n s i d e r e d .  OJe go o n  c o n s i d e r i n g  d o m e s t i c  and  w o r l d  marke t  
e q u i l i b r i u m  s e p a r a t e l y .  
Note 
I f  t h e  se t  
G q = O  
h a s  as o n l y  n o n t r i v i a l  s o l u t i o n  q = X p t h e n  G h a s  r a n k  n-1. 
I t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  f o r  q $: 0 , 3 q $: Xp b u t  
t h e r e  c a n n o t  b e  s a i d  more t h a n  t h a t  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  6 
h a s  r a n k  n-i d o e s  n o t  s e e m  r e s t r i c t i v e .  N o t e  t h a t  t h e  know- 
l e d g e  from demand t h e o r y  t h a t  K j q =  0 h a s  o n l y  t h e  n o n t r i v i a l  
s o l u t u i o n  q = Xp d o e s  n o t  h e l p  u s  b e c a u s e  it d o e s  n o t  i n f o r m  
u s  a b o u t  t h e  r a n k  o f  K  s o  t h a t  n e i t h e r  t h e  m a t r i x  o f  t h e  ag- 
g r e g a t e  income e f f e c t  n o r  t h e  m a t r i x  o f  a g g r e g a t e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
e f f e c t  h a v e  a  d e f i n i t e  r a n k .  W e  s h a l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p roblem 
i n  t h e  n e x t  p a r a g r a p h .  W e  have  a l r e a d y  s e e n  t h a t  n o t h i n g  c a n  
b e  s a i d  w i t h  c e r t a i n t i y  a b o u t  t h e  s i g n  o f  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
J a c o b i a n .  
Debreu [ 5 ]  h a s  a c t u a l l y  shown t h a t  when t h e r e  a r e  more con- 
sumers  t h a n  commodi t ies  t o  any c o n t i n u o u s  e x c e s s  demand f u n c t i o n  
s a t i s f y i n g  Walras 'Law c o r r e s p o n d s  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  endowments 
and  a  se t  o f  w e l l  behaved  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  
2.2 Uniqueness of equilibrium: conditions on.the ,?acobian 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Uniqueness of equilibrium becomes especially relevant when 
an equilibrium model is used in comparative static analysis. 
In this case the effect of the change in a parameter is investi- 
gated by comparing the equilibrium before and after the change. 
This is only possible if the equilibrium is unique. However, if 
the model is used in a dynamic context and a descriptive 
function is accorded to the algorithm used to compute the 
equilibrium, then whichever new equilibrium is computed by 
the algorithm is the relevant one. At any rate the model as 
a whole should be such that after a shift in parameters only 
one equilibrium is obtained, this is somewhat trivial. 
We now are interested in the uniqueness of equilibrium 
in the "ex ante" sense, so that the algorithm used to compute 
equilibrium is irrelevant because the algorithm does not 
select an equilibrium. 
2.2.2 Some theorems from the literature (cf.Arrow 
and Hahn [ 1 ] and Wikaido [1 1 ] . 
Define s 5 - z Z excess supply. 
A. Assume: 
1) that the excess supply functions are homogeneous of degree 
zero in prices; (HI 
2) for all p E sn2), ps(p) = 0 (Walras' Law) : (W 
3 3 R, finite positive such that for all p E Sn , 
s i (p) < R (boundednessl)): ( B )  
4) s(p) is defined at least for all p > 0 , p E Sn and 
is continuous wherever defined. If s(p) is not defined 
0 in p = p then lim 1 Si(p) = . This is the weakened 
P + PO 
continuity requirement. ( C '  
This is trivial if supply is given. 
2, S is the price simplex. 
n 
B. Assume further that 
1 )  s(p) is differentiable wherever defined; 
2) in equilibrium there is at least one commodity 
(say the nth) , for which Zs . (p) = 
.when pn = 0 , 
i l (the nth good is then called the numeraire). 
, (N) 
Consider now the Jacobian of n-1 commodities: 
or consider 
Without proof the fallowing theorem is stated (cf. Arrow and 
Hahn [ 11 for a proof. ) : 
Theorem for uniqueness 
Under assumptions A and B , there is only one price 
vector p E Sn such that s (p) 2 - 0 if ~ ( p )  has only principal 
minors with positive determinants. 1) 
This property of the Jacobian matrix is called the Gale 
property. It is quite difficult to give any economic inter- 
pretation to this property. Moreover it merely indicates a 
sufficient condition, not a necessary one. 
Because of this the discussion in this paragraph will 
have to be casuistic. We now proceed by discussing certain 
(sufficient) conditions which garantee uniqueness. 
The model under discussion can be considered alternatively as 
a national model with zero international trade (quota prohibit 
any trade) or as a world model with continuous national excess 
demand functions (cf. 1.5). 
A weaker formulation: If under A and B , J (P) has Gale 
property (GP) for all equilibrium PI then the equilibrium 
2.2.3 One household economy 
Consider an economy with only one household and let p* 
be an equilibrium for that economy: 
max u ( X I  
S.T. PX = PY 
in equilibrium 
s(p*) = y - x(p*) 2 0 
p* s (p*) = 0 
consider 
then 
p ~ ( p * )  2 PS (p) = 0 (if not then p* would not be an 
equilibrium) . 
Thus 
The right hand side will be nonnegative because of profit 
maximization (or when v is given because y (p) = y(p*) 1 .  
From the weak axiom of revealed preference we 
know then that p* (x(p) - x(p*) ) 0 . 
However, from profit maximization 
p*(y(p)-y(p*)) 5 - 0, so that p*(y(p*)-x(p*) 1 L - p*(y(p)-x(p)) - 
But at a given p there is only one s; p*s(p) is a scalar; 
p*s(p*) = p*s(p) would imply that both s(p) and s(p*) would 
be chosen at p* then there would be not only one s at a given p. 
Thus p*s (p) < 0 which implies that s (p) 1 0 , so that the 
equilibrium is unique. 
No use was made of the Gale property so that differenti- 
ability is not required. The model can however be shown to 
have the property. 
2.2.4 Kicksian economy 
An economy with m consumers, n commodities and given 
resources for each consumer is called Hicksian if 
where 
- 
m = pxh + ah py . h ( a h  is + parameter) 
The Hicksian economy behaves as if there is only one household 
and thus has a unique equilibrium. We shall come back to this 
matter in § 3.3. 
Note however that in the Hicksian economy all income classes 
spend their income in the same proportions over commodities. 
This is highly unrealistic. 
2.2.5 Gross substitutability 
Definition: Two commodities are said to be gross 
substitutable (GS) if as i < o for 
ap; 
J 
Under GS all off-diagonal elements of J(p) are negative and due 
to Walras' Law the diagonal elements then must be positive. 
Again without proof we state: 
Under assumptions A and B , if there is GS for all equilibrium 
prices then there is a unique equilibrium because J(p) then has 
GP for all equilibrium prices and the equilibrium price vector 
is strictly positive. Note that the sum of Jacobians with GS 
also has GS (this is not the case for GP!) GS however implies 
and that if 
pi = 0 , CSh(p) = -w for any i . 
h 
2.2.6 ~iaaonal dominance 
Definition: If J(p) is such that 
3 h(p) such that hi.sii(p) > L Isij(p) (hj(p) Vi < n 
1=1 
+I as 
then the economy has diagonal dominance (DD). (sij = - a 1 
Theorem 
If the economy has DD for all equilibrium prices and has a 
numgraire then the Jacobian has GP and the equilibrium is 
unique. 
2 . 2 . 7  Other sufficient conditions 
1) Theorem: If for all equilibrium P , J(P) is either 
positive definite or positive quasidefinite then J(P) has 
GP and P is unique under assumptions A, B. 
- 1 2) If J(P) is nonsingular and J (z(p)) is continuously 
differentiable for all P > 0, if lim LS. (p) = -m whenever 1 
P+P, 
poh = 0 then the economy has a unique strictly positive 
equilibrium. 
2.2.8 Consequences of the theorems for the national 
model with domestic price policy and quota on 
international trade 
Here we do not discuss uniqueness of equilibrium on the 
world market but concentrate on the uniqueness of domestic 
equilibrium. 
There are 4 cases to consider: 
a) Free trade: in this case the uniqueness of domestic 
equilibrium is trivial if the utility functions are, as 
we have assumed, strictly quasi concave. 
b) Domestic price policy only: the demand can be con- 
puted at given domestic prices in the same way as under 
free trade. The taxation nust however be adjusted such 
that the balance of trade and then also the government 
budget are in equilibrium. As long as for all possible 
taxation levels an increase in taxes leads to a decrease 
in the value of demand (evaluated at world market prices), 
this equilibrium will be unique. 
c) Completely closed national economy: here the theorems 
mentioned above apply directly. 
1) Hicksian economy 
If the utility function is homothetic and if all consumers 
have the same utility function then the economy has a unique 
equilibrium. We shall return to this matter in section 3. 
2) Gross substitutability recalling the Slutsky equation at 
national level we write: 
- 1 E = V (H + GP) . 
For the definition see § 2.1 . 
* Under free trade the equation at the national level dould be: 
E = W + K  
even if K' is assumed to have GS for all income classes then 
j still CB1 will not have this property as the sign of it is quite 
unclear because of aggregation, whether the GS of K is then 
strong enough is difficult to say. But even the assumption 
on K is very restrictive. 
* - 1 In any case when E = V H the substitution term is 
completely dropped from the equation.' ) It is then the lncome 
effect after tariff redistribdtion which decides on the Gross 
Substitutability. 
We know that V has DD with positive elements on the 
diagonal. This does not imply very much however on the inverse 
of V . Even if H happens to have GS then the GS property of 
- 1 V H is not obvious. 
3) Diagonal dominance 
Similar reasoning applies to diagonal dominance. The 
sum of diagonally dominant matrices is not necessarily a 
diagonally dominant matrix so that even the diagonal dominance 
in all income classes would be insufficient to prove diagonal 
')If there is a dorestic price policy for all commodities 
dominance a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  Moreover t h e  p i c t u r e  i s  a g a i n  
d i s t u r b e d  by r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  e f f e c t s .  I f  n o t h i n g  can  b e  s a i d  a t  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  n o t h i n g  can  be s a i d  a t  world l e v e l .  
(Quas i )  p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e  J a c o b i a n ,  Non-singular  J a c o b i a n  
Again t h e  a g g r e g a t i o n  and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  e f f e c t  made it i m p o s s i b l e  
t o  d e r i v e  any c o n c l u s i o n s .  
d )  The model of  s e c t i o n  1 
* The J a c o b i a n s  d e r i v e d  b e f o r e  under  t h e  assumpt ion  
p"(y - x )  = 0  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e l e v a n t  f o r  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  model w i t h  quo ta  because  w e  have s e e n  t h a t  
W i n  t h i s  c a s e  o n l y  p  ( x  + s - y )  5 0  c o u l d  be  proved.  
* For  t e s t i n g  t h e  uniqueness  of  domes t i c  e q u i l i b r i u m  
one would need a  r e f o r m u l a t i o n  of  t h e  J a c o b i a n s  under 
t h e  assumpt ion  t = - p 1  + v r  + @ ( P - ~ ~ )  z i n s t e a d  of 
W p  ( y - x )  = O , ( z = x + s - y )  . 
W e  would however a g a i n  b e  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  t h e  problem o f  
a g g r e g a t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  above.  Moreover, t h e  J a c o b i a n  d e r i v e d  
under t h i s  s p e c i f i c  t a x a t i o n  r u l e  would n o t  l e n d  i t s e l f  t o  v e r y  
much economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a s  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  from which it 
s tems was p u r e l y  t e c h n i c a l .  We s h a l l  t h e r e f o r e  l e a v e  now t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  J a c o b i a n s  and t r e a t  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  uniqueness  i n  a  
more c o n s t r u c t i v e  way: 
I f  a n  a l g o r i t h m  d e s i g n e d  t o  compute domest ic  e q u i l i b r i u m  
converges  t o  one and o n l y  one s o l u t i o n ,  i f  t h e  e x c e s s  demand 
i n  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  i s  a  c o n t i n u o u s  f u n c t i o n  of  wor ld  market  p r i c e s ,  
we conc lude  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  uniqueness  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  a  r e -  
s t r i c t e d ,  b u t  s u f f i c i e n t  s e n s e .  
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SECTION 3 :  THE COMPUTATION OF DOMESTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
3 . 1  Computation of domestic prices at given domestic 
availability 
The previous paragraph has been disappointing. Because 
of aggregation and redistribution effects not even a non- 
singularity property could be attributed to the Jacobian. 
This leads us to an even more casuistic approach where on 
the basis of specific features of the utility function the 
uniqueness of equilibrium can be investigated. 
For reasons which will become clear in 3.2 we are mainly 
interested in the uniqueness of domestic equilibrium in the 
restricted sense that we investigate whether to any given world 
market price and to any given total domestic availability 
(which satisfies the balance of trade equilibrium and 
the quota constraints) corresponds a uniaue domestic 
equilibrium price. This condition is not sufficient for the 
uniqueness of domestic equilibrium in the sense of § 2 .2 .  
The model of § 1 then becomes 
max 
S.T. 
while ~ z j  < 5 . 
- 
j 
j 
We assume further that ct = . j PY 
- 1 The corresponding Jacobian is F = V G . 
Again nothing in general can be concluded about the 
structure of F. 
We shall not only be interested in uniqueness (U) but also 
in direct computability (DC) of domestic prices. By this we mean 
that donestic prices can be computed without making use of a pro- 
cedure in which equilibrium is reached in an iterative way. 
No general theory will be presented. Only a few examples 
will be discussed. 
3.1.1 Utility ~aximization; uniqueness and direct 
computabilitv of domestic eauilibrium urice 
We assume as before that the utility function is continuous, 
strictly quasi-concave' and has Continuous first and second 
derivatives and a positive first derivative. 
3.1.1.1 General case: 
From the first order condition follows: 
We know that 
- 
H(~' - xJ) > 2 , 
- 
j 
and that 
The uniqueness of the solution is not clear and it is 
obvious that we cannot decide whether the solution is directly 
computable (DC) . 
3.1.1.2 One income class: one household economy 
We know already from § 2.2 that the. equilibrium will 
be unique in this case. 
- 
Pi - aai 
a~ Ph - ax, 
The right hand side is given so that domestic prices follow 
directly. 
Note that if there had been more income classes with the same 
utility function, neither U or DC could have been established 
in general. 
3.1.1.3 One common utility function, more than one 
income class 
a) Dualitv theory: 
Before we discuss cases with more than one income 
class a very brief introduction into duality theory will be 
provided. 
The problem I a :  max u ( x )  
PY = m 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  w i t h  
I b :  max u  ( x )  
W X  = 1  
where 
U i ~ a e r  f a i r l y  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  f rom d u a l i t y  t h e o r y  emerge. ( c f . D i e w e r t  [ 6 ] ) .  
* m = m (.p, u) i s  concave  and l i n e a r  homogeneous 
and  monotone i n  p  . 
u  
* m ( y , u )  = 1 d e f i n e s  i m p l i c i t l y 1 )  a f u n c t i o n  - = 1  . 
h  ( y )  
u  = h ( y )  is  c a l l e d  t h e  i n d i r e c t  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
1 
- = g ( y )  u  i s  c a l l e d  r e c i p r o c a l i n d i r e c t  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  
W e  t h u s  g e t  
f rom t h i s  f o l l o w s  
s o  t h a t  
So t h a t  
1 ) * > 9 m > 0 ,  t h i s  is a  n o n s a t u r a t i o n  a s sumpt ion .  i f  a m  
thus 
This relation is called Roy's identity. 
Defining 
- 
Si = PiYi (the income share allocated to commodity i). 
Roy's identity i s  
Note that we know already from the primal problem Ib that 
au - ), Cx - - 
i ax, 
Defining 
one gets 
b) Homothetic utility function 
* It can be proven (Diewert [ 6 ] )  that if the utility function 
is homothetic, both the indirect utility function and the 
reciprocal indirect utility are homothetic. 
* A utility (or production) function u = F(x) is said to 
be homotheticr if it can be written as 
u=F(f(x)) r 
where 
dF 
- > 0 , F(0) = 0 , lim ~ ( £ 1  = and 
df f 
f(x) is positively linear homogeneous and concave. 
A homothetic function has the following properties: 
1 
u = 1 ($ - F(Xx) 1 is a monotonous function 
and 
I 
If g = n ( y )  is a hornathetic function then it can be written as 
Multiplying y by m yields: 
thus 
and 
so that 
k is only a function of prices so that 
as x 
- -  - 0 and aln i 
aln m = I  . am 
c) One common homothetic utility function 
After these preparations we are now in a position 
to discuss uniqueness and direct computability. 
By definition 
We haye seen that when the utility function is homothetic 
s = s (p) so that all income classes have the same budget i j i j 
proportions (because they are confronted with the same price 
by assumption). 
We thus get 
and 
The economy can thus be considered to be Hicksian, so that 
uniqueness of domestic prices can be established. 
We know that 
Moreover: 
so that 
1 )  
and 
2 
so that the price ratios can be directly computed. 
- 
X i the demand proportions by income class are given - . 
Define xn 
- 
x, 
and 
then 
P B X  = p d  j so that the demand is 
n j 
The direct computability has thus been obtained because 
d) Cobb Douglas utility function functions with different 
coefficients between income classes 
n 'ij 
= 
; a > 0 ; u concave . 
j i=1 i j 
We know that in this case the utility function is homo- 
thetic so that 
- j a.. PX e , where e7 = 2 @ = -pixi = ph Z Y ~
h j Iaij PY 
el is constant so that the system is linear at given @. i 
Writing Ti as a diagonal matrix one gets 
p(X- OA) = 0 (1) 
where 
If we assume indecomposability of A the uniqueness 
follows from the Perron-Frobenius theorem. We then also 
may conclude that the equilibrium price will be strictly 
positive. I / @ * ,  p* will be dominant eigenvalue and eigen- 
-- 1 
vector of AX . This case will play the central role 
6 )  Reconsidering the problem of direct computability 
we may say that it amounts to finding a "simple" solution 
for the prices from the primal and dual equations: 
a) primal equations 
b) dual equations 
c) budget equations 
m = Zp, dij j 
- 
where a = a, z i  + yij . i j -- 
d) domestic availability 
We can see iron b) that at given prices a solution xij can be 
calculated easily. 
Summation of b) over income classes yields 
where 
el = 
i aln p i 
After substitution of c) the implicit nature of the equation 
and the possibility of non-unique solutions are obvious. 
As a matter of fact none of the well known non-homothetic 
functions seen to yield direct computability (CRES, CRESH, non- 
homothetic CES, addilog, translog). See e.g. Hanoch [ 7 ] .  The unfruit- 
fulattemptstodothiswillnot be presented here. This does not imply 
that none of them has a unique solution but only that the 
uniqueness is not proved and seems to be more of an exception 
than a rule. Anyhow the Cobb Douglas case is at this moment 
the only one which can be solved by linear methods, is deriv- 
able from either direct or indirect utility theory and yields 
different expenditure shares for different income classes. 
3.1.2 Some summarizing remarks 
3.1.2.1 Dynamic demand models 
We have seen that in static demand models direct comput- 
ability can only be derived in very simple cases while unique- 
ness is very difficult to prove in the other cases. 
As a consequence direct computability must be bought at 
the expense of the flexibility of the econometric specification. 
These constraints are of course serious but one should keep in 
mind that they only need to be imposed on the short run demand 
functions. We take the Cobb Douqlas case as an example. In 
the Cobb Douglas case every income class allocates expenditures 
to commodities in a predetermined way. 
= a m ijt- jt 
We know from duality theory that 
Where g = g. (p/m) is the indirect utility function of the j th j J 
income class. Any econometrically estimable indirect utility 
function can be used to generate the income shares, but this may be 
supplemented by all kinds of non-economic variables. Although 
the practical advantages of the approach are obvious, the 
short run specification is still a Cobb Douglas specification 
with all its limitations. 
The same applied to the other approaches discussed 
before: the long run demand functions (sijt = s ijt-1 ) need 
not be influenced by the limitations on the short run functions. 
3.1.2.2 Car-mitted expenditures 
Up to this point we have assumed that the demand within 
the period is determined in one step. If one however assumes 
that the utility maximization only applies to the so called 
"uncommitted" expenditures while the committed demand is 
totally inelastic (subsistence levels), the model can be 
extended: 
max 
The total demand is then 
All the previous derivations apply after redefination 
of the income and the demand. The income elasticity of demand 
is not unitary anymore when the utility function is homothetic. 
now 
so that 
m X 
- j i j 
- / I 
1.n j "ij 
the income elasticity for luxury good is likely to drop with 
rising income while the income elasticity for necessities will 
increase. 
Committed expenditures however present the problem that 
if the quantities committed by an income class exceed its own 
endowment the positiveness constraint on the uncommitted income 
might be violated at certain prices. 
3.1.2.3 Inputs for production: Even when outputs are 
considered to be lagged, inputs are not so that the pure 
exchange economy does not depict this case. When the income 
classes are assumed to own their production factors, their 
(gross) savings must be equal to their (gross) investments. 
If the demand for inputs is determined in a production submodel, 
the cost of these inputs has to be considered as committed 
expenditures for the Gonsumer. The production model must how- 
ever take into account that certain limits have to be imposed 
on the savings capacity of the class (sector). 
Under the present assumptions it would be theoretically 
more acceptable to determine investment and consumption plans 
simultaneously by maximization of a (multiperiod) utility 
function within the constraints of the factor resource endow- 
ments given expected prices and given a technology. 
This would however be quite complex so that the decentral- 
izing assumption seems preferable by which producer and con- 
sumer decisions are taken separately. We shall return to this 
matter in 3.3. 
3.1.2.4 The necessity of direct computability 
The direct computability requirement lacks any theoretical 
basis. If one however wants to compute a domestic equilibrium 
under quota it is highly expedient if one is able to perform 
"complementary pivots" in a simple way. By a pivot is meant 
that up to a certain switch point the quantities of certain 
commodities are kept constant while their prices are allowed 
to vary (and vice versa for the other commodities) and after 
the switch point some other list of comrnoditiies with constant 
prices prevails. This will be explained in more detail in the 
next paragraph. 
Another argument in favor of direct computability is that 
it allows a simple solution for a quasi-equilibrium (in a quasi 
equilibrium all equilibrium conditions are met, except that the 
prices are not equalized between markets). 
3.2 Domestic eauilibrium under Cobb Douslas utilitv functions 
3.2.1 Introduction 
We shall now extensively study the case in which all income 
classes have Cobb Douglas utility functions with different co- 
efficients. This case was already discussed before in § 3.1.3.4. 
We recall that the set of demand equations could at given 
domestic availability be written as an eigenvalue system: 
where 
p : domestic price vector (dominant eigenvector of AX-' ) 
$ : taxation level (reciprocal of dominant 
eigenvalue of AX-') 
A = aih 
= ' ('ij ' e  ) jh 
J 
'ij endowment of ith good in jth income class 
e jh income share allocated to hth commodity by 
j 'h income class. 
When X is not given the computation of domestic equilibrium 
is more complex. We shall now derive a procedure to solve this 
problem. 
Before we discuss the computation of domestic equilibrium 
two theorems by O.L. Plangasarian [It!] will be presented. 
1 .  Consider the linear complementarity problem of finding a 
T 
z in Rn such that Mz + q > 0 , z > 0 , z (Mz + q) = 0 
- - 
where M is a given real n x n matrix and q as a given vector in 
RII . 
A 2-matrix is a matrix with nonpositive off diagonal elements. 
If M is a 5-matrix, then for any p > 0 the solution z of the 
linear programme 
max 
T 
P 2 
S.T. M z + q > O  - 
solves the linear complementarity problem. 
2. If M is a 2-matrix, then for each q for which the poly- 
hedral set S = {z 1 Mz + q - > 0 , z > O} is nonempty, S contains 
- 
a unique least element, which is the solution of the linear pro- 
gramme for any p > 0 . 
- 
z is a least element in S if Z < z ,  ; z E S . 
- 
Note that nothing is said about the uniqueness of the solution 
of the linear comp1ementarit.y problem. 
There are three cases which must be distinguished from the outset 
1 .  the case with import quota only; 
2. the case with export quota only; 
3. the case with both import and export quota. 
3.2.2 Import quota only 
Define the diagonal matrices X = [ xi 1 
Define aih = Lyijejh , 
j 
The model may be written as follows, if we assume taxation 
- 
proportional to wealth (a = pyJ/py) j 
1 .  Consumer demand 
2. Definitions 
W 
u = P - P r u ~ O  . 
3. Market equilibrium 
u ( H - X )  = O  
4. Policies 
x 5 El 
- 
5. Balance of trade equilibrium 
W W 
P X l = P A l  
6. Assumption on instruments 
* Under free trade, that is when no quota are effective 
(PW (H-A) 2 0') ) the system reduces to: 
-
W W p X = p A  (Clearly balance of trade equilibrium is satisfied) 
* Under domestic price policy 2  - 3  and 4 may be left out 
and replaced by 
Assuming p > 0 and defining 
one gets 
and 
W p X = p W ~  .
We now discuss the more general case with import quota. 
We assume for expository purposes that co price policy is pursued. 
Consider first the solution for given @ = @ '  then if uH = uX holds 
W p x + UH = 6 ( p W ~  + uA) . We can formulate the linear complement- 
arity problem: 
1 )  
pw > 0 -  , we shall maintain this as an assumption until 3 . 2 . 4  - 4 .  
* )  We have assumed throughout this paper that p > 0 . 
Where 
again 
(H - @*A) has nonpositive off diagonal elements 
so that the L.P. solution is available. This solution does how- 
W W 
ever not guarantee that p x = p y , because 4' was fixed. One 
must iterate over 4 in a so called parametic linear programming 
W procedure. For this we must investigate what the effect on p x 
is of a change in 4 . 
The linear programme is: 
min p I 
S.T. ~(II-+-A) + pW(~-4'~) -> o 
and lllo 
Denote by p* the optimum of the original problem. 
a) When 4' decreases no element of p* increases: p* is the 
least element of the polyhedral set. When 4' decreases all 
constraints become ineffective so that in the new optimum the 
goal function will have a smaller value (if it was non-zero). 
This implies that some elements of p must decrease. Assume 
that the first h elements decrease and the other increase. 
This is impossible because the original optimum is contained 
in the new set so a vector some elements of which are larger 
than in the original optimum cannot be a new optimum because 
it cannot be the least element (Theorem 2). q.e.d. 
b) *ifp + n p i > o  then AXi i A4 - = o  
AXi 
*if pi + Api = 0, pi > 0 then - > O  A$ = 
* 
'i = 0 (then by a) also Api = 0); now: 
From this we can derive 
A $ is negative, Ap is seminegative so that 
W 
Pi Axi is negative (for pr > 0) . 
W A decrease in $ thus generates a decrease in p x. Two 
conclusions may be drawn: 
a) Because we know that an equilibrium solution exists 
W 
and because p x is monotonously decreasing when$ decreases, 
only one equilibrium solution exists, which can be obtained 
from the linear programme. The linear complementarity problem 
could have had more solutions. The solution obtained is very 
attractive because it has the smallest value for all the com- 
ponents of the vector p . 
b) The equilibrium solution can quickly be computed by 
iterating over decreasing $ , starting at every step the 
linear programme from the optimal solution of the previous 
step, which is known to be feasible for the current step. The 
montonicity property also makes it possible to efficiently 
adapt $ . 
c) Graphically the situation is as follows 
for $ > I$ max the linear programme is infeasible. 
@ *  is the equilibrium level. It is not clear whether it is 
below or above 1 . 
T 1 )  This is not the case: H - $ A )p* = 0 , 
rnax 
P* > 0 then 
(H - $ A ~ ) ~ *  > o , H~ > A~~ for $ < $ max thus (H - $ A ~ )  
has nonpositive off diagonal elements and positive diagonal 
elements and a positive inverse, so that it has Gale property 
(it is a Minkowsky matrix, see [3]). Following Samelson, Thrall, 
Wesler [12] the solution is then unique. 
If for @ = 1 a solution is feasible it is not necessarily 
the free trade solution, nor does it imply balance of trade 
equilibrium. 
@ = 1 implies pW (x-y) + p1 = 0 . 
Clearly if p = 0 we have a free trade solution and balance 
of trade equilibrium is fulfilled. 
If 1 = 0 we have the autarkic solution. 
We finally note that @ max is the reciprocal of dominant 
- 1 
eigenvalue of the matrix AH , a senipositive indecomposable matrix. 
3 . 2 . 3  Export quota and domestic price policy: 
the model is now 
1) consumer 
pX = @pA 
2) normalizations and definitions 
- v = p -  PI P ? V > O  
- 
- 
- 
3 )  policies 
- 
p = p* (given) 
4) market equilibrium 
5)  balance of trade equilibrium 
pW ( X + S - A )  1 = O  
6) assumptions on instruments 
. S is the diagonal matrix of excess supply 
. K =  
Fle first write down the linear complementary problem 
- - 
- 
define q 5 (X+S-K)I ; P = , s = S I .  
Then the equations may be rewritten as 
T- - 1. q P - v K =  ( F A - v A )  - p K  
We note that s plays no role in the determination of v, q . 
Consider 1, 2, and 3a, for a given value of (I . The matrix 
(K - (IA) again is a Z-matrix. 
Consider 
Min vl 
- 
S.T. V(K-(IA) + G A - p K ?  0 
- 
v > o  - . 
- 
This programme solves the linear complementary problem 
1, 2, 3a. Does the solution satisfy 3 b? It does. 
To see this we first note that v  = p is a feasible basis for 
the linear programme. 
By Mangasarian's second the ore^ we know that the solution 
of the linear programme is the least element of the polyheder, 
so that v*  5 - v for all feasible v; thus v*  - < p . 
- 
The linear programme thus solves the equations 1 - 3 . 
We can show in a similar way as was done for import quota that 
pW (S+X-Y) increases as increases. 
We note that$min is the reciprocal of the dominant eigenvalue 
3.2.4 Import and export quota, domestic price policy 
3.2.4.1 The model may be written as 
1) consumer 
PX = @PA 
2) normalizations and definitions 
3) policies 
D I H  
D 2 I< 
- 
- p = p* 
4) market equilibrium 
pD = 
vD = vK 
p.S = 0 
S > O  - 
5 )  balance of trade equilibrium 
W p (D-A) 1 = 0 
6) assumptions on the instruments 
W 
p r 2 0, pW1 - < o 
y > r > l  - 
- p* > 0 
all the variables are defined as before. 
Define q, = (D - ~ ) 1  
we may write 
The matrix is now: 
K - @ A  I 
H - @A 
Note that this is not a Z-matrix. 
-
Define T P = (vr L'I S) 
then the standard linear complementarity problem is 
q = N p + n  
Pq = 0 qrp 2 0 
We know that @ min < @ < @ max. 
- - 
-1 Where@min is reciprocal of the dominant eigenvalue of A K ; 
-1 @max is reciprocal of the dominant eigenvalue of A H . 
The present case cannot be reduced to any of the linear 
ororJramrninn situa.tj.ons mentioned in Mangasarian ' s article. As 
a matter of fact we cannot formulate it as a quadratic programming 
case either. 
We shall however show that Lemkets algorithm will converge 
for the present problem and develop an alternative algorithm. 
Before we do so some possible simplifications will be discussed. 
3 . 2 . 4 . 2  Economic interpretation of the domestic eaui- 
libriurn with quota: The cases with quota are characterised by the 
feature that if one quota constraint becomes effective a price change 
arises which may make other constraints effective. For this to 
occur at least one constraint must be effective at the original 
domestic prices. As soon as this is the case complex "resonance" 
patterns may arise. We thus do not know a prior which constraint 
will be effective and which will not. This is the reason for the 
complexity of the problem. In the linear complementarity case 
under consideration some cases however yield useful information. 
1 )  It is trivial to remark that when n - > 0 the L.C.P. has 
the solution p = 0. We further disregard this case. 
2) When -p (K - @ A) 2 0 , the L.P. solution with import 
quota only also solves the problem with.both import and 
export quota. 
Proof 
* Under import quota p 2 p . 
- 
t px = @ PA SO that axi 
- > O f o r i + j  . 
ap; 
2 
If an import quota is effective the export quota is not so that 
if no export quota was effective before imposition of import 
quota no one will be after q.e.d. 
3) When p ( H  - @ A) 2 - 0 the L.P. solution with export quota 
only also solves the problem with both import and export 
quota. 
4 )  An export constraint cannot become effective if (Ki - @Ai) - < 0. 
As a consequence such constraints may be dropped from the linear 
complementarity problem. 
Proof: the ith constraint is 
T T T qi = (Ki - @Ai)(vT - gT) + @ A i  u 
- 
If (Ki - @Ai) - < 0 then for all 0 - < v - c p, u 2 0 we get 
9i > 0 , because A is a semipositive vector. We shall i 
assume that the L.C.P. only contains export quota which may be- 
come effective. 
We rewrite the L.C.P. after deleting n-m constraints: 
r(i7 - , - -(Ti- @zT) I K, Zi: m x m ,  m < n 
- 
L O 0 0J 
m x m  m x n  m x m  
dimensions: n x m n x n n x m 
L m x m  m x n  n x m  - I
- 
The matrices A, K are principal minors of A, K respectively 
- 
(relevant rows and columns deleted) while in the matrices A and k 
the relevant columns have been deleted but the relevant rows have 
been replaced by zero's. 
3.2.4.3 Convergence proof of Lemke's algorithm 
We shall not discuss here Lemke's algorithm. For reference the 
reader should consult Cottle [2] or Cottle and Dantzig [31 . 
We essentially follow the development by Cottle and Dantzig. We know 
that the L.C.P. has an equilibrium solution for @ m i n ~  @ 5 @ max. 
- - 
If Lemke's algorithm does not converge it then must terminate in 
in a ray. (Cottle-Dantzig theorem 1 ,  corollary.) 
For this to occur there must exist a non-negative vector p 
such that pi (Mp) 2 0 (Cottle-Dantzig theorem 4) 
with Mpi < 0 ifpi > 0 . 
To proof that this cannot occur we proceed in three stages: 
1) In a ray we must have pivi = 0 when defined. We. drop 
transpose signs for v and y . 
assume y . v  f 0 i i 
then for a ray we must have 
and 
this is impossible. 
2 )  Assume t h a t  ( o n l y )  t h e  f i r s t  h  i m p o r t  c o n s t r a i n t s  have  
p o s i t i v e  pi  and  t h a t  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  e n d s  i n  a  r a y .  Then: 
I n  m a t r i x  form f o r  pi > 0 
- 
 
=T ( H  - @ A  ) u  + c 5 0 w i t h  c 1 - 0 . 
- 
=T The m a t r i x  H - $,A however h a s  n e g a t i v e  o f f  d i a g o n a l  
e l e m e n t s  and  p o s i t i v e  i n v e r s e  s o  t h a t  it h a s  t h e  s o  
c a l l e d  G a l e  p r o p e r t y .  ( I t  i s  a  s o  c a l l e d  Minkowsky m a t r i x . )  
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  s y s t e m  h a s  no o t h e r  s o l u t i o n  t h a n  y = 0 . 
3)  Given t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  a  r a y  p = 0 w e  must  have  i n  a  r a y :  
T h i s  would imply  t h a t  a  p r i n c i p a l  minor  o f  ( K  - $A)  ; 
( K  - @zT) s h o u l d  have  a  s o l u t i o n .  
b u t  
-T - ( K -  $A ) v  = (K1-  $ x T ) v  
Where K'  i s  formed by t h e  f u l l  rows of  K c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  K 
- T 
and  A '  i s  formed by t h e  f u l l  rows o f  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  zT 
The q u o t a  c o n s t r a i n t s  imply :  
( I -  $ x f T )  V - 2 ( K t -  $ ~ ' ~ ) p  
s o  t h a t  
- ( - 4 x 1  T) p > O  . 
- 
F 3 r  t h e  o t h e r  rows ,  t h a t  i s  f o r  t h e  rows f o r  which vi = 0 t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  imply  
Hence a  r a y  would imply  
T - 
- ( K  - @ A  ) p  2 0 t h i s  i s  f n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  w i t h  o u r  
a s s u m p t i o n s  so t h a t  Lemke's a l g o r i t h m  must  c o n v e r g e .  
3.2.4.4 The parametric complementarity problem: from an 
almost - complementaritv alsorithm to a complement- 
aritv alaorithm. 
Up to this point we have assumed that @ is given. This 
parameter must however be adapted in such a way that the balance 
of trade equation is satisfied. One way .to do this would be to 
solve a series of complementarity problems through Lemke's 
algorithm. This is however quite expensive if only because 
Lemke's algorithm cannot take very much a priori information 
into account. Moreover we did not yet prove the uniqueness of 
the solution so that a parametric approach might cause serious 
problems in terms of continuity. 
We shall therefore develop a new algorithm very strongly 
inspired by Lemke's algorithm which operates along a fully 
complementary path and which has only one driving variable: @. 
In this paper only a sketch of the algorithm will be presented. 
It is based on two features. 
1) To X = K (all export quota effective) and to 
X = H (all import quota effective) there corresponds 
only one nonzero price vector (which is determined up to a 
scalar) and only one value @ , the dominant eigenvector and 
- 1 
receprocal eigenvalue of the matrices AK and AH-' respectively. 
Moreover to that given value of @ corresponds only one 
X and one p , this may be seen as follows. We know that the 
only semipositive solution of @ *  p ~ ~ - '  2 - p is p = p* 
(dominant eigenvector) and p * > O  ; 
thus the only nonnegative solution of @ *  pA 5 pH is p* 
but p* X = @ *  p*A = p*H . (The same holds for K.) 
2) The L.C.P. has thus a unique1) solution for @ = @ max 
and @ = @ min which is relatively simple to compute. The 
idea to be sketched below is that starting for example from 
X = H, @ = @ max , a pivoting algorithm along a 
complementary path with decreasing , will yield a de- 
w w 
creasing value for p x until p x = pWy i.e. until balance 
of trade equilibrium is reached. Before we further develop the 
algorithm we give an economic interpretation. 
If we disregard the trivial solution p = 0 . 
* Economic interpretation: An increase in $ implies that 
the ratio of the value of expenditures to the value of receipts 
(in domestic prices) increases through a decrease in the level 
of taxatign. At constant prices this certainly implies an 
increase in all demands so that the balance of trade reacts 
accordingly. However, prices change thraugh the changed 
pressures of demand. Can they "overreact" in such a way 
that demand decreases? An intuitive answer would be negative. 
We shall show that intuition is right. 
There are three types of commodities to be distinguished 
1) Commodities, which have the same active quota constraints 
before and after the change in $ . These commodities do not 
directly influence the balance of trade as their demand is 
constant. They, however, exert an influence on the demand 
for other commodities, through possible price changes. 
2) Commodities which were unconstrained by quota and remain so. 
3 )  Other Commodities 
* The non-switchinq case. 
We shall first neglect the third category and assume that 
a change in $ does not generate any "switches". The demand 
system may then be written as: 
At a given (XI, X2) , (pl , p2) is the dominant eigenvector, 
I/$ the dominant eigenvalue. Suppose p and X1 do not change when 2 
$ changes. 
Consider a decrease in from b to b* 
The demand system after the change may then be written as 
Define: Pil = [X - $*A] 
T =  [X - $ *  A]-'. 
* < $ so that T is known, by the  erro on--Frobenius 
theorem to be strictly positive. 
This may be written as 
(by Frobenius) 
We may conclude that the diagonal matrix A X 2  has negative diagonal, 
so that the demand for the commodities of the second category will in 
the present (non-switching) situation decrease. Thus in the non- 
switching case 
> 0 for i E group 1 
= O  for i  group 2. 
As long as not all the commodities of group 1 happen to have a zero 
price on the world market we have 
* Switches: we need to prove that in the third group of 
commodities : 
If we decompose a change in @ into small components we 
get segments along which no switch occurs and nodes at which 
switches occur. 
switch switch 
I,---\ 
6 + @max 
- Because along the segments we have 
AXi > o , 
- - 
A@ 
we can eliminate the case that with decreasing $ new import 
quota become effective. 
- 
< 0 
The only possibility for - A6 is then that an existing 
export quota becomes ineffective. This could have resonance 
effects on the other constraints. But if we can exclude this 
possibility the resulting resonance will not occur either. 
We show this by proving that along the segments no price 
increase occurs when @ is decreasing. 
Define M = T- ' with corresponding decomposition. We know 
- 
- 1 that p2 AX2 - 
- P2 T22 
Substitution in the first set of equations yields: 
From the partitioned inverse we know that 
We know that 
- 1 
so that PI + P2 M21 Mll > 0 
We therefore know that pW(x - y) will react monotonously to a 
change in 4, although ApW(x - Y) = 0 is possible (see below) . A @ 
Our argument however started along a segment and not in 
the node @ max. We therefore need to produce the first segment 
on the left and side of @ max. 
This is easy because the price vector in @ max is only 
determined up to a scalar. 
Let the desired domestic price be p and the eigenvector in @,,
P* = Xa* Let X be such that p* - > p with one equality (no 
special complications occur if there are more equalities). 
th * - Let the i component have pi = pi . Any decrease in 41 will 
- 1) then make p < pi for X = H . Perform a complementarity i 
- 
pivot for the ith import constraint: Set the price pi = Pi and 
let Xi "free". We then have the first segment; decrease @ until 
- 
it is "blocked" by pj < pj or Xh < Kh perform a complementary 
pivot etc. 
Stopwhen IpW(x- y)l < E . 
Because of the monotonicity result proved above the algo- 
rithm will converge. We also have proved the uniqueness of 
the equilibrium (disregarding the trivial one with p = O), because 
under a change in @ there was a unique path from a unique solution. 
This is independent from the choice of X 
In terms of the graph we have 
The vertical lines indicate switches, 1)  
* The algorithm has not yet been programmed. 
* It is not clear whether it will be more efficient in the 
one sided case than the L.P. method. It anyhow also 
applies to that case. The algorithm then can be started 
without the computation of an eigenvalue. To see this 
consider the case of export quota only. Start the algo- 
rithm for a large value of $ with all prices set at p = 6 
and all quantities variable, then decrease $ etc. 
* When the world market prices are adapted in order to reach 
world market equilibrium the algorithm can be used in a 
parametric way: 
a) If all commodities are subject to a domestic price policy 
the change in world market prices only affects $ '  so that the 
old equilibrium is a feasible starting point. 
b) If some commodities are "unprotected" it may be necessary 
to repeat the whole complementary pivoting part. The starting 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors need however not to be computed 
again. 
3 .2 .5  Alternative taxation policies 
3 .2 .5 .1  Constant share in taxes by income class 
(i) No price policy, import quota only 
The line might have 'flat" parts. This will be the case if fhe 
commodities which are not fixed in quantity would have zero prLce-on 
the world market. If such a flat would occur at pW(x-y)=O there 
would be multiple equilibria. In this very in-.probable case we choose 
the largest possible value of $ so that the algorithm remains un- 
changed. 
The consumer model for this case is: 
In equilibrium uH = uX 
Substituting this in the demand equations one gets 
T T UH + pW x = P(Y - la )E + pW Y ~ E ~  
where Y = [Y. . I  matrix of endowments i owned by j; E = [eij] 3 1  
define T T M = H -  (yT- la ) E  
Then we may write the model as a linear complementarity 
problem 
T If we assume that (yT-la ) E ~  is nonnegative then N has 
the useful property that it has nonpositive off diagonal 
elements so that it is a so called Z-matrix. 
Note that MI = 0 so that the balance of trade equilibrium 
is automatically satisfied by the demand equations. We now make 
use of the theorem by Mangasarian [lo] according to which the 
present linear complementarity problem can be solved by a 
single linear programme. 
T 
min c p 
Note that this problem can be solved in one step, without 
iterations over a parameter $I . 
(ii) Export quota 
The same holds for export quota except that now the 
matrix (yT - raT) E~ must be nonnegative. 
(iii) Domestic price policy, import and export quota 
For this case we develop our own algorithm, as the conver- 
gence of Lemke's algorithn is doubtful and a simple alternative 
procedure is available. 
The central equation is 
T T (I - Eal ) Xp = E(I - a1 )Yp + Xe . 
Where p is the column vector of prices. 
e = Ea 
W 
A = p  ( x - y )  
X is the diagonal matrix of aggregate demand (n x n) 
Y is the matrix of endowments by income class (m x n). 
Define T T A = (I - E a1 )X - E(1 - a1 )Y 
Take X as given. 
The set of equations Ap = b is consistent if and only if 
T T y b = 0  where y is the solution of y A = 0  . 
T Note that 1 A = 0  so that the set of equations will only 
be consistent for X = 0  . 
The algorithm proceeds as follows: 
1) Set X = H 
2) Determine the solution Ap = 0  . This solution is positive 
and has only one degree of freedom if a reasonable 
assumption is made, as will be shown below. 
It may thus be written as p = pp* . 
3 )  Determine p such that p > - p with one equality say the 
th commodity. 
4 )  Effectuate a pivot for the ith commodity. 
This is done as follows 
define 
Write the central equation in partitioned form 
( -  C l l  + Dl, X1)pl + ( -  CI2 + D12 X2)p2 = 0  
( -  C21 + D21 X1)pl + ( -  C22 + D22 X2)p2 = o  . 
Let commodity group 1 have effective quota constraints 
(X is given, 1 1 unknown) and group 2 ineffective constraints 
(p2 is given X unknown). Indicating the constant variables 2 
by bars and writing again matrices in capital letters, the 
system can be rewritten as 
Define 
ck = [ClI01 , Y ( )  A* = D ( ~ 1  0 F ~ - C  o ) k , 
We have the nonhomogeneous system: 
k Lb A Y k 
T k  Note that lTAk = I b = 0 . 
The system has a known particular solution y k 
P 1 
where for k = 0: = ph , h = l,..n-1 
more in general yk is the blocked value of the previous step. 
P k 
5) Compute the general solution of Akyk = b ; 
The solution space is then 
k 
with Y ,  > 0 and y: > 0 (to be proved below). 
k k  k Let Y E -  be vector of blocking values for y (y 2 yb) . 
6) Decrease p , starting from p = 0 . If balance of trade 
equilibrium is reached stop, else decrease p until yk is 
k blocked by yb . 
7) G o t o 3 ) .  
The convergence of the algorithm is obvious, 
- Ax - 2 O O , by construction. 
A P G -  
W Again p (x - y )  as a function of p m.ay show "flat" se~~ents. 
We still have to prove, that under a certain assumption 
k yk = b has a positive general solution determined up to 
one scalar. 
r 1 
Define -k 0 - 1 
= - A + I 
if Fk > 0 then by the Frobenius theorem there is a dominant 
eigenvalue and corresponding unique and positive eigenvector. 
(that is a vector determined up to one scalar). Moreover 
T k  
I F = lT so that this dominant eiqenvec.tor is the solution of 
k (I - F ) z  = 0 and the positiveness of yk follows directly. 
Fk > 0 means that 
c1 xl-' +D,-I > 0 . 
A sufficient condition for this is that 
E(I - CXI~)Y + E ~ I ~ x  > 0 
so that the condition is satisfied if 
which is the condition we have already found in the one side 
case 
T E ( Y - a r ) > O  . 
The condition is sufficient, not necessary, on the other hand 
T E(Y - a1 ) > 0 would be necessary but not sufficient. The 
convergence conditions thus lie in between the conditions for 
the one-sided problems when L.P. is applied. 
3.2.5.2 Constant distribution of income 
(i) Import quota 
J 
Define 
yT = BT E 
Then we may write 
T 
~ H + ~ ~ x = u H I  y + 6 T ; 
define 
T PI = H(I - Iy ) 
W-1 T Again the corresponding matrix N = p M has nonpositive 
diagonal elements so that the solution with the linear programme 
is available. 
T T Again MI = H (.I (1 - y I ) = 0 as y I = 1 so that balance of 
trade equilibrium is realized. The export case is analogous. 
(ii) The case of domestic price policy 
The matrix on the left hand side will always be singular. 
and 
If Q is singular then 3 X f 0 such that 
T A -  ( l - T ) y X = O  . 
T Premultiply by yT , then remembering that y I = 1 : 
T T y T y X = 0 which is possible q.e.d. 
Thus the linear complementarity methods cannot be applied 
in a straightforward way when domestic price policy is in- 
volved. Moreover, when both import and export quota are 
involved the usual convergence conditions for Lemke's 
algorithm are not satisfied. We are not able to prove that 
it cannot end in a ray. 
(iii) A pivoting algorithm for the case with import and 
export quota and domestic price policy 
We therefore develop an alternative algorithm of the same 
type as sketched before. 
We know that in equilibrium of the balance of trade 
T T p X (I -ly ) = 0 
T T the matrix (I - IY ) is singular, so p X is determined up to 
a scalar and is positive. r p T ~  = Ab 
W Find Alp such that p W ~ ~  = p y , and such that the domestic 
market is in equilibrium. 
The algorithm proceeds as follows (the convergence is obvious) 
1)  set X = H  
2 )  determine A, p such that 
p T ~  = Ab , and p > p with one equality say for the 
- 
ith commodity. 
- 
3) Set pi = pi 
4) Decrease A until it is blocked by an export constraint 
x. > K. or by ph 2 Fh . 3 =  3 
* In the first case set X = K and do not further consider 
j j 
this commodity (except in (5) ) . 
- 
* In the second case set pk - 
 Pk - 
5 )  If IpW(y - XI) > E go to (4) . 
The algorithm has the advantage that the pivoting does not 
involve any matrix inversion, and only one solution of a simult- 
aneous set of equations. 
3.3 Some furthex results on the computation of domestic 
equilibrium under tariffs and quota, in a pure exchange 
economy 
In this section no new algorithm will be developed. It 
will only be investigated in which cases the algorithms of 
section 3.2,or a convex programming algorithm can be used to 
compute domestic equilibrium. 
Hicksian pure exchange economy with quota 
Consider the optimization: 
max u (xj ) 
S.T. pxJ = pyj + a. tr 3 
The first order conditions are: 
u(xJ) is assumed to be homothetic then (cf p. 46)  ; 
We may thus consider the case 
1) Consumer: 
max u ( X I  
S.T. px = py + tr 
2) Government: 
1 ~ y - x ( r  
- - 
3) Market equilibrium 
p = p w + p - v  
v (y - XI = vr 
P,V,P 2 0 
4) Balance of trade: 
pwx = pwy 
We show that this model i s  equivalent with: 
max u (XI 
S.T. pwY = pwx 
and l ~ y - x t r  - . 
Define again h = y - 1 ; k = y - r 
The Lagrangean is: 
X has been taken out of brackets because we assume that it is 
positive. This will be the case as long as 
* > 0 for all commodities entering the utility 
ax: 
I 
function. This condition also guarantees pW - v > 0 for i i 
these commodities so that no slack variable for the export 
constraint needs to be introduced. Weaker assumptions would 
be possible but will be investigated when needed. 
Note that the uniqueness of equilibrium is obvious as 
long as y > 0 . 
Among the first order condition we find: 
au We know that - > 0 , V x  so that p 2 0  will also be 
axi - 
satisfied q.e.d. 
A gradient algorithm can solve the maximization problem. 
It has however to be considered in which case a complementary 
pivoting algorithm of the type derived before can also be used. 
3.3.2 Domestic equilibrium in a Hicksian economy with 
domestic price policy, quota and a CES utility 
function 
then 3 - au 6.x 
- -P --+ - (p+l) 
aqi au 1 i 
Due to the Hicksian character of the economy the taxation 
system is irrelevant for the determination of prices and aggre- 
gate demand. We therefore set up the following algorithm: 
1) Set x = h  (all import quota effective) 
2) Determine the relative prices from: 
- 
3) Set p in such a way that p 2  p with one equality say for 
the hth commodity. Consider the set of equations: 
for i = l,...,h - 1,h + l,...,n 
In pi - ln ph = ( p  + 1)(1nxi - ln xh) + 1. (2) 
- 
Ph is constant, In (x ) is variable. h 
For a given ln(xh) we have Cn - 1) linear equations in n - 1 
unknows . 
4 )  ln(xh) is the driving variable. Decrease it until 
Pi or x blocked. i 
- 
5) Pivot (this only involves setting pi = pi and xi free, 
no matrix inversion or the like is involved). 
6) Stop the algorithm when pWx = pWy . 
Convergence conditions: 
- - - 
L -8 
if pi constant In xi = knp, - lnPi + in 21 /(p + 1 1  + in xh 
6h 
if xi constant: In pi = 
As long as p + 1 > 0 the algorithm will certainly converge. 
- ( p + 1 ) lnZi + inch + in 41 + (p + 1 ) lnxh 
6h 
This is equivalent to the condition that the elasticity of 
substitution 
must be negative, a totally acceptable assumption. 
3.3.3 Generalized CES 
The algorithm is obviously unchanged if the Mukerji- 
Dhrymes-Kurz function [ 7  1 is used, provided the convergence 
conditions are satisfied. 
( 1 )  Any free quantity or price may be chosen. 
- -  
-1 du a U  - a.b.x bi .- = 
axi i i i  1 'Pi 
du p 
a bi xibi-1 
thus i - Pi b-1 - -  
a b x h  h h h  Ph 
convergence conditions: 
aibi 
lnpi = In - + In ph + (bi - 1) In xi - (bh - 1) In xh 
ahbh 
aibi 
In xi = ln(= + lnFh - lnc.)/(b;l) + (s 1. ..) 
bh 1 
It is sufficient for convergence that - > O  . 
bI 1 
Further generalizations may be possible but will be looked 
for when they are needed. Actually it seems that the principle 
of the algorithm would apply in most cases where we can show 
direct computability. The algorithm is however the most useful 
when not only domestic prices can be computed easily at given 
domestic demand, but when also complementarity pivots can easily 
be computed, essentially a sort of combined primal dual demand 
functions is needed, otherwise the maximization problem would 
seem more efficient. 
3.3.4 Pure exchange economy where the commodities with 
quota form a linear expenditure subsystem 
Consider : 
max u. (xj) 
3 
S.T. pxj = cpPy' 
and 
The first order conditions are; 
define - A h  - LBjyhjaij ; h,i = l,..Ik j 
then; 
PIXl = @PIA -I- $b 
The complementary pivoting algorithm for the L.E.S. case 
applies are. The initial pl must however be calculated as a 
generalized eigenvector. This yields a procedure to compute 
domestic equilibrium for a pure exchange economy in which the 
commodities with quota form a linear expenditure subsystem. 
3 . 3 . 9  Hicksian pure exchange econoEy with domestic price 
policy and quota 
The complementary pivoting algorithm is only applicable for 
a specific type of utility function. We now describe a para- 
metric convex programing algorithm for the general case. 
Consider the following maximization problem 
max 
S.T. 
u (XI 
- 
p x = p y + t  
1 ~ y - x c r  
- 
x 2 0  
- 
- - - - 
For all t E T = {tip 1 5 -  t - < p r) , 1, r finite, 
- 
and for any strictly quasi concave utility function this 
problem is a feasible convex programming problem so that 
it has a unique solution. 
!.:oreover, provided pWr > 0 , we know from section 1 that 
- 
W there will exist a t = t* such that p (x - y) 5 0 . The 
situation is analogous to the one occurring in the complementary 
- 
pivoting scheme: t is the driving variable which is adjusted 
until the balance of trade constraint is satisfied (preferably 
W with equality). It is again the monotonicity of p (x - y )  as 
a function of t which would (at positive world market prices) 
guarantee the uniqueness of the domestic equilibrium. Whether 
this condition is fulfilled depends however on the specification 
of the utility function. 
Anyhow, in equilibrium we find for this algorithm. 
this coincides with the market equilibrium conditions. Intro- 
duction of a technology: g(y) 5 - 0 within the constraints of the 
maximization problem yields the solution for a Hicksian economy 
with production. 
3.3.6 Domestic price policy, quota and stock policy in 
a pure exchange economy with L.E.S. 
When the government operates a stock policy it tries to 
maintain a certain desired stock ( s ) .  
If however the government also subjects the ith comnodity 
to a domestic price policy and to import and export quota, the 
stock policy may also be used in order to more or less maintain 
a desired domestic price (6.) while quota constraints are binding. 1 
In this case the domestic price policy may overrule the stock 
policy in a sinilar way as the quota policy overrules the 
domestic price policy. We present the model for this case. 
1 )  Consumer: PX = @PA 
> 0 2) Definitions: p = p + p - v, p =  
4) Equilibrium conditions: p(y - x - s - 1) = 0 
v ( y - x - s - r )  = O  
~.r (s - smin) = 0 
V(S - smax) = O 
IJrv 2 0 
W 5) Balance of trade: p ( Y - X - s )  = O  . 
The boundaries s min and s max need not be physical, they 
can be considered as limits outside of which the stock policy 
cannot be overruled. The previously derived complementary 
pivoting algorithm solves this case after some minor 
modifications. This is easily seen after substitution of the 
third and fourth equilibrium condition into the first and second 
respectively. 
We again can write pH = pX and 
vK = vX , 
where 
H = [yi - li - Smin, i 
K = [Yi - ri Smax , i 
I 
I 
Negative elements of K represent export quota which cannot be 
active and thus can be discarded. 
Considering these equations together with the consumer demand 
equation, we have the basic elements for the pivoting algorithm. 
It remains to be seen what the influence of a change in 4 is on 
the balance of trade. 
The variable which needs explicit solution is s ; 
- 
s = Si + qi i 
- - 
yi =max (yi - x - s - r 0) + min (yi - x - s - lit 0) i i i ' i i 
This allows to compute the balance of trade deficit. 
The introduction of stock policy as an extra instrument 
implies that the net export of a certain commodity remains un- 
changed when a quota is effective but that the effectiveness 
of a quota constraint does not automatically imply overruling 
of the domestic price policy. The pivoting algorithm proceeds 
as before. Note that when one knows that the domestic price 
policy will not be overruled, a direct iteration over taxation 
rates can be applied. The balance of trade equilibrium implies 
again equilibrium of the government budget, by the consumer's 
budget equilibrium: 
income tax = - {tariff receipts+receipts on sales of stocks) 
= - {(p" - p) (y - x - S) + p(yP- s)) 
3 . 3 . 7  Stock policy in Hicksian pure exchange with quota 
The consumer equation in the previous paragraph is changed 
and the domestic price policy is omitted. 
The constraints are now: 
0 - 5 Smin 5 S 2 3 max 
PW(x + s) = pWy 
We consider the utility maximization under these constraints 
(and x, s 2 0) . 
- 
The Lagrangean is (taking again X out of brackets). 
The Kuhn-Tucker equilibrium conditions are 
The constraints 
x i + s i - h . < O  1 = ; pi(xi + si - h.) = 0 
1 
x + s i - k . > O  ; V .  (X + si - k.) = 0 i 1 = 1 i 1 
S - S  G O  ; P i b i  - 
'min, i ) = O  i min,i = 
S - K O  ; 
'max,i = Oi(s - 'max, i ) = O  i i 
x, s, P, v, P, $J, A 2 0 
We assume that smin > 0 
t h e n p W + p - v - p + @ = O  
This policy is not one in which stock policy is always over- 
ruled by quota policy: the price at which the domestic consumer 
can buy does not always get priority over the policy of adjusting 
stocks. It may be much "better" to have the consumer price go up 
and sell stocks on the world market. We shall however not go in- 
to welfare theoretical arguments in this paper. 
3.4 Domestic equilibrium in an economy with lagged 
production quota, domestic price policy and/or 
more than one consumer 
3.4-1 Linear technology, no intermediate inputs 
In an economy qith production, factor ownership is the 
primary income distributing mechanism. 
* When all producers own the factors they use and no 
intermediate inputs are involved, the lagged output 
is also fully owned by the producer and the pure 
exchange case follows. 
* A s  l o n g  a s  t h e r e  i s  a  l a g  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  and  no i n t e r -  
m e d i a t e  i n p u t s  a r e  i n v o l v e d  a p u r e  exchange model c a n  
b e  o b t a i n e d  i f  s p e c i f i c  a s sumpt ions  a r e  made on t h e  owner- 
s h i p  o f  o u t p u t .  
* W e  c o n s i d e r  a  l i n e a r  t echno logy :  
Y = ( Y . )  f i n a l  o u t p u t  1 
q = (qh;  1 
I 
l e v e l  a t  which t h e  kth a c t i v i t y  t o  p roduce  
t h e  ith p r o d u c t  i s  o p e r a t e d  
b  = (bk 1 f a c t o r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
t e c h n o l o g y  m a t r i x :  r e q u i r e m e n t  on t h e  k  t h  A = Ak,hi 
f a c t o r  when t h e  hith a c t i v i t y  i s  o p e r a t e d  
a t  u n i t  l e v e l  
D = Di 1 hi o u t p u t  o f  i when h  i s  o p e r a t e d  a t  u n i t  l eve l .  i 
The v a r i a b l e s  a r e  d e f i n e d  i n  s u c h  a  way t h a t  t h e  nonze ro  e l e m e n t s  
o f  D have  u r , i t  v a l u e .  
* The f a c t o r s  b  a r e  owned by t h e  income g r o u p s .  
b = z b  j 
j 
* The p r o d u c e r  i s  assumed t o  maximize t h e  v a l u e  of  t h i s  o u t -  
p u t  t h i s  y i e l d s  t h e  p r i m a l  and d u a l  l i n e a r  programme, 
max p  D q  
S.T.  A q  5 b  
- 
s 2 0  
min w b  
S.T. wA 2 - pD 
w , o  - 
V a r i o u s  d i s t r i b u t i v e  a s s u m p t i o n s  c a n  b e  made: 
a )  I f  w e  assume t h a t  t h e  o p t i m a l  o u t p u t  Dq* i s  d i v i d e d  o v e r  
f a c t o r  owners  s o  t h a t  
'1 Dq* = 
w*bJ , 
t h i s  y i e l d s  t h e  endowment y J  = h i  Dq* w h i c h  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
J 
t h e  f a c t o r s  a r e  p a i d  i n  k i n d  b e f o r e  t h e  exchange .  
b j  An a l t e r n a t i v e  a s s u m p t i o n  would b e  t h a t  t h e  income d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  between f a c t o r s  i s  se t  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  r a t i o  
c) There is however also a possibility to evaluate the factor 
rentals on the basis of current prices. Suppose the optimal 
basis is AB and that all factors are fully employed then 
As long as price fluctuations between periods are small, 
the current value of w computed under changing current prices 
will be positive; this implies that the production decision 
taken at the expected prices would be unchanged under current 
prices. As soon as this is not the case some elements of w 
become negative: factor owners are penalized for wrong decisions. 
Combinations of the distributive rules a), b) and c) are also 
possible and may be desirable in order to show different 
types of price risk to which owners of different factors are 
exposed. (The approach is still deterministic, allocations 
are made on the basis of expected prices; no future markets). 
The rules a) and b) can obviously be introduced without 
leaving algorithm developed within the pure exchange framework. 
This is not so certain for rule c) as will now be shown 
for the L.E.S. case. 
Consider pi xij = Omj eji 
This yields: 
If the technology selected is AB with output YB (we 
assume Y to be unique even if it is produced by a combination B 
of techniques, because of the production lag) and if all 
factors are fully employed we get 
AB YB = b 
- 
W AB - PB DB (assume AB is nonsingular , square) 
(note that for all pB: pB DB YB = w b) 
defining C = we get p X = $p C 
If C is semipositive the previously derived algorithm will 
converge otherwise problems arise. This is a matter of distri- 
bution of endowments and differences in tastes between income 
- 1 groups: YB = AB F I  is known to be positive. If all income 
groups were equal this would imply the positiveness of C. 
3.4.2 Economy with production and domestic price policy 
As soon as intermediate inputs are involved one has to 
abandon the pure exchange view. Even if outputs are given input 
demands are not. As long as prices are given that is as long as 
a domestic price policy is effective the problems are not too 
serious because a recursive approach is feasible: 
1. Calculate input demand at given prices; 
2. Consider these as committed expenditures for the 
investing class; 
3. Calculate consumer demand at given income, given endow- 
ment or the like (see 3.4.1), given the committed 
expenditures. 
There may however be savings constraints on these invest- 
ment plans. We shall now discuss these problems. 
Assumptions: 
1. To any domestic price vector corresponds a unique 
net supply; 
2. Outputs have a one year production lag (or more); 
3. All desired domestic prices are positive. 
ad 1 - This assumption is made in order to maintain the unique- 
ness of excess demand at given world market prices. The 
assumption is not unreasonable when many factors are 
fixed so that diminishing returns to variable inputs 
are likely to occur. 
ad 2 - This assumption is not unrealistic: on the one hand 
it permits to show the financing problem for the farmer 
who has to buy current inputs, while on the other hand 
computation is simplified as the outputs can be taken 
as given endowment. 
ad 3 - This assumption is realistic. 
- 
- 
1 -  P i - P i  f o r  a l l  i . No s a v i n g s  c o n s t r a i n t  
When a l l  commodities have a  d e s i r e d  domest ic  p r i c e s  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  p l a n  under p r o f i t  maximizat ion  i s  f u l l y  predetermined:  
world market  p r i c e s  do n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n d l u e n c e  s u p p l y .  
The p roducer  might  however be  unab le  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e  i n v e s t -  
ment needed. 
- 
- 
2. pi - p i  a  i. S e c t o r a l  . savings  c o n s t r a i n t s  as a  s i d e  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  n e t  revenue maximizat ion  
Suppose t h e r e  i s  a  t a x a t i o n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  w e a l t h ,  t h e n ;  
Where 
x j  i s  t h e  demand by t h e  j  th income class 
y j  endowment o f  t h e  income c l a s s  
1-4 i s  t h e  ra te  o f  t a x a t i o n  PY ' PX 
PY 
W it i s  s e t  i n  o r d e r  t o  m e e t  pWx = p  y a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l .  
m = OPYJ i s  t h e  d i s p o s a b l e  income o f  t h e  s e c t o r .  j 
Suppose a s a v i n g s  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  set :  
s .  < B m B .  i s  g i v e n  
I =  j  j  I 
j d e f i n e  t h e  demand f o r  i n p u t s  by t h e  jth c l a s s  a s  q . 
The s a v i n g s  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  a  s i d e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  maximizat ion  
of  n e t  revenue : 
The world market  p r i c e s  can  t h u s  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  inves tment  
th rough  t h e  t a x a t i o n  p o l i c y .  The s i m u l t a n e i t y  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
t h i s  way would be  avoided i f  t h e  s a v i n g s  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  fo rmula ted  
as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  e a r n e d  i n s t e a d  o f  d i s p o s a b l e  income: 
< BJ p y j  
'j = j  
savings constraint 
In this case the production plan is dependent on world 
market prices. As the output is lagged the receipts have only 
an expected value based on expected yields and expected prices. 
This introduces price risk, a feature which needs special 
attention but which will not be discussed in this paper. 
Anyhow, the demand for inputs needs to be computed again 
at all world market prices. This is cumbersome as the production 
model will usually be quite complex. It may be advisable to use 
simplified demand functions for inputs (e.g. based on constant 
price elasticity) for use during the world market iterations. 
This case is similar to the previous one. 
3.4.3 Economy with production and quota on inputs which 
are not consumer goods 
3.4.3.1 Linear technology 
* Consider a producer with a linear technology, and 
a one period lag in production, 
* no savings constraint is considered. 
* The government confronts this producer with a 
minimum and a maximum on the import of current 
inputs (the assumption of a minimum import may 
be unrealistic but is maintained for generality). 
* The commodity may be produced domestically but it 
is a net input and is not used by the consumer. 
The model now would be: 
1) Producer 
max P1 x1 - P2 X2 
2 )  government policy. 
3) market equilibrium. 
The equilibrium conditions of the linear programme are: 
A (b - A x )  = 0 
The model can be seen as a linear complementarity 
problem. 
Define: 
the L.C.P would be: 
However, as M has the structure shown above, the solution is 
identical to the solution of the L.P. 
max PIXl - P2X2 
S . T .  BX 5 -(9 
this implies that the producer would react in the same way as 
if he was directly exposed to the desired domestic prices. This 
implies that the demand for inputs can be considered to be 
predetermined and thus treated as a committed expenditure for 
the "investor" independedly whether the economy is Hicksian 
or not. This assumes however that 6, is given for the producer. 
If we assume quota on outputs also and assume that the expected 
price for next period equals the realized price for the current 
period pl is not given anymore. The previous approach still 
holds when many producers are considered. 
* If every producer has a linear goal function with the 
same coefficient and a convex technology, the maximization 
of the aggregate goal function under the technology yields 
the same result as individual profit maximization. As 
expressed by Koopmans [8], this mathematically trivial 
property has important economic consequences in terms 
of decentralization of decision making. Mathematically 
speaking it only says that when the goal function is linear 
and the constraints have a block diagonal structure the 
blockwise solution of the programme is equivalent with 
the total solution. 
* In the linear programming case introduction of quota 
on inputs however, introduces interdependence (a row in 
the matrix). Special algorithms are available which 
make use of this special structure of the aggregate 
technology matrix. 
3.4.3.2 Convex technology 
* The convexity guarantees a unique optimum. 
The problem now is: 
- - 
max p1 X1 - p2 X2 
S.T. g(x) 5 - 0 
and k i x  - 2 =  < h  
X Z O  - . 
The Lagrangean is 
the equivalence is again obvious. 
3.4.4 A Hicksian economy with production and quota 
The model for this case is: 
1) Consumer 
max u(xj) 
(u homothetic) 
2) Producer 
max pyj 
j S.T. g (Y) 2 0 (convex) 
3 )  Government 
tr = (pW - p) (y - x) 
1 S Y  - x 5 r  
4) Market equilibrium 
1-1 (Y - x) = 1-11 
v(y - x) = ur 
W p = p  + p - v  
PrlJrV 2 0 
5) Balance of trade 
W 
P Y = pwx 
We prove that this case is equivalent to 
max u(x) 
S.T. pWx=pwy 
and l l y - x ~ r  - 
j j NOW L = u(.x) + [h(pw + - v)  (y - X) -14 g (yJ)] + h constant 
- axi = [k - hpg xi = o 
utility maximizing 
au conditions 
- -  
axi < 0 xpi = 
profit maximizing 
conditions 
constraints 
market equilibrium 
The previous cases suggest situations jn which the 
optimization problem can easily be decomposed. We can sumar- 
ize the previous discussion by saying that as long as the 
economy is Hicksian, no domestic price policy is introduced, 
and no savings constraint is imposed on the production plan, 
the equilibrium problem is a convex optimization problem. As 
soon as the economy is non-Hicksian the conflict of interests 
between income classes destroys the optimality property of 
equilibrium. The introduction of domestic price policies also 
causes problems: 
In the model the change is minor: 
W p = p + p - v replaces p = p + p - v 
But the consequences are significant: the problem is not 
longer an optimum problem as the dual variables are constrained 
it is a nonlinear complementarity problem only, which can be 
solved as a parametric convex programming problem. We discussed 
this under 3.3.5. 
The computqtion of domestic equilibrium; summary 
To summarize the situation at th.is moment, the algorithms 
presented to solve domestic equilibrium problems are listed 
below. Scarf's fixed point algorithms as mentioned in § 1, is 
disregarded. It could solve all the cases mentioned below, 
. specific policies like food aid, asset redistribution, stock 
policy are not explicitly listed: 
domestic 
domestic price 
free price policy and 
trade policy quota quota 
One consumer* 
no production 
More consumers 
no production 1 2 4 4 
One consumer* 
production 1 2 3 6 
More consumers 
production 1 2 (7) (7) 
1. Direct computation, for the consumer through dual, for 
the producer either through dual or primal; 
2. iteration over taxation rate (assumption: no inferior 
goods) ; 
3. convex programming problem; 4,5 can solve special cases 
of this; 
4. complementary pivoting algorithm. The commodities with 
quota form a linear expenditure subsystem; several taxa- 
tion policies are possible; 
5. 4 but also valid for generalized C.E.S. utility function; 
6. parametric convex programming; 
7. only solved for cases with quota on inputs which are not . 
consumer goods. 
* 
A Hicksian economy is considered as an economy with one 
consumer. 
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